Mike Gansey’s not asleep anymore…

In a stunning move yesterday with a rival who has never, not once, gotten the better of us in a trade, the Sixers dealt Paul George, two first-round picks, and two second-round picks to Boston for disgruntled Celtics star Jaylen Brown. I don’t even know where to start.

I guess the most important item of note — and one that probably shouldn’t be lost debating the finer points here — is that Jaylen Brown is good at basketball. Brown is coming off a season where he had 28.7 PPG, 6.9 RPG, and 5.1 APG, placed 6th in MVP voting, and earned Second-Team All-NBA honors, just barely missing the last First-Team slot to Cade Cunningham. As I’m sure you’re aware, he’s also a Finals MVP and proven performer both in and out of the playoffs, who has unfortunately shown the proof of that against the Sixers on more occasions than I’d like to recall. People can get hung up on the analytics side of the Brown debate (stay tuned for a deeper breakdown here next week) and lose track of the overall fact that he has been a consistent top-two contributor to one of the best teams in basketball for the last decade.

Almost more importantly than all of that, though, is his durability. He’s never played fewer than 57 games in a season — a number that Paul George has only hit once since the 2018-19 season in OKC — and has been hovering right around 70 games played per year in four of the last five seasons. We’ve been begging for years to be able to stay afloat with Joel Embiid off the court, and Gansey just acquired a player with a proven track record of helping his team do exactly that, having just carried the Celtics to the two-seed in the East without Jayson Tatum. This is humongous for Joel and especially Tyrese Maxey, who has been forced to shoulder almost the entirety of the team’s offensive load for the last couple of years, leading the league in minutes and carrying most of the scoring responsibility.

We have plenty of time to talk about the fit and play style, but the primary takeaway from this trade should be that the Sixers have gotten far more talented on the whole.

All that said, I was initially much more shocked than actually excited by the trade when my phone initially blew up at 6:17 PM yesterday. First, there was absolutely no hint that a move like this was coming. Second, dealing with the Celtics in the Process era has always been a traumatizing experience, with the Fultz and Horford experiences taking up a heavy load of mental bandwidth. Third, and most critically, however, is that it’s just so weird to take a core player from a rivalry team that I’ve hated with a passion for the last 10 years.

The locker room will also be interesting, to say the least — we are just two months removed from Jaylen Brown calling Joel Embiid a flopper after their intense seven-game playoff series. It’s the same feeling I’d have as if the Eagles suddenly traded for Dak Prescott from the Cowboys. Am I supposed to like this guy now? I just spent almost a decade of my life focused on finding ways to hate him, and now he’s on my team? It’s a rewiring of my brain chemistry, and my emotions don’t quite know how to handle it.

Even beyond the emotional side of it, the roster math still has me a little confused. The Sixers still need at minimum one more contributor in the frontcourt, ideally someone who can hold up in the playoffs (LeBron James on the minimum anyone?). As currently constructed, they’re still relying on Adem Bona and Ariel Hukporti as their only centers — both of whom I believe are solid backups, but also aren’t players I trust to combine for 48 minutes in a night when Joel Embiid is inevitably out.

However, after today’s Anfernee Simons signing for two years and $12.3 million, they are running into a bit of a math problem with only $4.3 million remaining under the hard cap. They conveniently have a $4.2 million trade exception thanks to Jared McCain, but the options are limited, and they have only one open roster spot remaining. None of that changes the calculus on the trade itself — it just means the front office can’t be finished. I know this drill all too well: get excited about a big move, then watch ownership stop just short of closing the gap that actually needed closing.

But even accounting for the lack of depth, this is still the most aggressive the Sixers have been since the Jimmy Butler and James Harden trades. We’ve spent every season dreaming about the newest possible target we could add to the team to maybe, just maybe, make a run if things broke right… only for the front office and ownership to trade away talent for purely tax-ducking purposes once we reached the deadline. Gansey is coming in and going for it with a move that has shaken the league to its core; that has to count for something.

I love it the most for Embiid’s sake though, with the Sixers not just letting the big guy’s last few seasons of (sorta) health waste away into oblivion. We’ve spent the last two years focused on finding the fun in the little things, without any real contender to put our full effort behind. It would have been far too easy to mentally check out over the next few seasons while we waited for the Embiid and PG contracts to clear up cap space again. The team was a little too good to actually target a tank again (nor would the new lottery system allow it), but wasn’t good enough to make us really believe it could go anywhere, as the Knicks so aptly showed in this year’s playoffs. Now we are all forced back on board the train, whether we like it or not, and can finally put our full-hearted effort towards winning games again.

Will it work? Who knows! In fact, probably not! It doesn’t work for most teams, and especially not when that team is the Sixers! But it’ll be fun regardless and provides a real draw to a season that I, for one, can’t wait to get sucked into. Just give me some time to process the emotions first.

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This is the third and final article breaking down my thoughts on every realistic option for the Sixers at pick No. 22, covering the final category of player: guards! You can find my thoughts on the options for wings here and the options for bigs here.

Guards won’t be a popular category of choice for this relatively backcourt-loaded team, but at 22 you’re looking for the best player available and the guard depth in this class is strong. For all the talk of “we have too many guards” as a reason for the Jared McCain deal, we quickly ran out of ball handlers in the playoffs when under the bright lights, leaving Tyrese Maxey and VJ Edgecombe to fend for themselves. The Sixers need to get an NBA player at No. 22 regardless of position, and if there’s a clear gap in player quality on the board in comparison to the bigs and wings available, you need to trust your board.

Once again, I’m not evaluating anyone in the consensus top 12, with how unlikely they are to make it within the Sixers’ range. That means Darryn Peterson, Darius Acuff, Keaton Wagler, Mikel Brown Jr., Brayden Burries, and Kingston Flemings are all not included in this piece. But this level of depth at the top of the board does make it more likely that some talented guards will fall on draft night into our range.

Read through the full player profiles on whoever interests you, or just skim the “Beckett’s Thoughts” sections to get a feel for where I have everyone and why. Let me know who you agree with or think I’m missing out on!

Dream Pick Category

I was incredibly tempted to have a couple of guards labeled as a dream pick (specifically my top two below), but as much as I love some of these players, team fit has to come into play somewhere. The only two long-term pieces I personally am building around at the moment are Maxey and Edgecombe, and as long as we’re dreaming, I’d rather get some of the prospects in the previous two pieces that project as a possible long-term starter next to those two.

Solid Selection Category

Labaron Philon: Guard - Alabama

Profile

Height/Wingspan, Weight: 6’2.5”/6’6”, 176 lbs

Age: 20.5

25-26 Stats: 22.0 PPG, 5.0 APG, 39.9% 3P%

Plays Like: Immanuel Quickley, Darius Garland

A dynamic combo guard who has showcased dominant productivity both on and off the ball throughout college — can he keep it up against NBA size?

Pros

• Philon has elite lateral quickness and a terrific ability to get to his spots on the court. He pairs this with arguably the best ball handling in the draft and a tight and dynamic dribble that he uses in great tandem with his shiftiness.

• His quickness and ability to create space pairs very well with his pull-up shooting off the dribble, where he is confident in creating his own shot. Even with a jump in volume, his scoring efficiency took a big leap, both at the rim (58.1% in 2025 → 65.7% in 2026) and from beyond the arc (31.5% in 2025 → 39.9% in 2026).

• Philon is more scoring-oriented, but he is a very capable passer when he needs to be (2.0 assist-to-turnover ratio) running Alabama’s pro-style offense this past year. He had a massive uptick in pick-and-roll volume and consistently made the right play either calling his own number or setting up his teammates.

• He has a few defensive questions as we’ll get to in the next section, but you can’t question Philon’s motor as a player. He is able to play bigger than his height — with a 6’6” wingspan — and knows where to be positionally thanks to his IQ.

• He was simply extremely productive across the board this season, leading Alabama to a top-three offense in college basketball and both scoring and facilitating effectively across all levels of competition.

Cons

• He’s just SO very small at 176 lbs and it terrifies me. The weight and subpar strength show up in his lack of rim pressure, relying more on his floater/runner package. That said, he’s not shy of contact and gets to the line at a high frequency (where he shoots ~80%) which helps counter some of his rim volume weaknesses. But he will need to show that same capability against NBA-level athleticism.

• There are questions defensively for Philon. This past year as a sophomore he wasn’t effective for an NBA prospect, but there’s an interesting tradeoff where he was much better as a freshman when carrying a lower offensive load (he had an 89th percentile usage this past season). He’s small and will more than likely be bullied around a bit, but was seen as a defensive playmaker last season, so he has a chance to be disruptive on that end to overcome the size limitations.

Beckett’s Thoughts

I’ll lead off here by stating that I’m always a bit concerned about guards that are this small, and the Alabama system has spit out a few draft busts at the guard position in recent memory (shoutout to Kira Lewis Jr. and Joshua Primo). But I’m putting my instincts behind me and believing in what Philon has been able to do over the last two years. Outside of his weight, Philon has just about every possible positive indicator you can get in a guard with excellent shotmaking both on and off ball, strong playmaking, and some of the best ball handling in the draft.

He showed the ability to play in a secondary role next to Mark Sears in his freshman year, much the way he would fit next to Maxey or Edgecombe. But he also showed the clear ability to play in a lead-guard role this past season, and could immediately provide juice off the bench as a rookie for the Sixers. The combination of an elite balance of skills and capability to play both on and off the ball makes Philon my favorite fit of any guard option if he were to fall to number 22.

Ebuka Okorie: Guard - Stanford

Profile

Height/Wingspan, Weight: 6’1”/6’8”, 186 lbs

Age: 19.2

25-26 Stats: 23.2 PPG, 3.6 RPG, 3.6 APG

Plays Like: Jeremiah Fears, Dennis Schroder, Prospect Tyrese Maxey

An incredible driver who creates a high volume of scoring chances both for himself and his teammates, but may need development on defense and off the ball to find his place at the next level.

Pros

• Okorie is a walking paint touch with his acceleration, explosiveness, and craft. Nearly half of his overall shot attempts came at the rim, and he also used those touches to get to the FT line consistently, where he shot 83.2% on 7.3 FTA per game.

• A key driver of the elite rim pressure is his terrific handle, and I personally see him as the best ball handler in the draft (just a touch above Philon). The ability to dribble around players in isolation or split doubles and traps (which he saw a lot of) is otherworldly, and he just makes it look easy.

• The shooting seems like it should translate with his FT indicators and aggressive volume at 9.7 three-point attempts per 100 possessions (3PA/100), most of which came off the dribble. He’s not the shooter that someone like Christian Anderson is, but he only needs to be capable with the dribble-drive capabilities he has.

• He is a capable passer and can make the right reads when the defense bends to him. Not elite as a point guard (see below) but isn’t a black hole either. This is all he really needs to be a functional player given how much attention he pulls in with his rim pressure.

• Okorie is extremely long with a 6’8” wingspan that lets him play bigger than his height. He is effective at using that length to deflect passes defensively and he had a strong block rate for a guard, giving some hope for future defensive development down the line.

• He is the singular reason that Stanford had a strong offense this past season. It’s a miracle he was as effective and efficient as he was in Stanford’s environment, where he was doubled as much as any other player in college basketball last year.

Cons

• Okorie is more of a scorer than a pure floor general right now. There’s not much manipulation of the defense and he is more just reading whatever clear option is available once his scoring angles get cut off. That said, he had the aforementioned tough environment at Stanford with subpar options to pass to, which makes the playmaking a bit more difficult to evaluate.

• That same brutal Stanford environment makes it tougher to evaluate Okorie’s off-ball impact because he simply didn’t have a way to play off the ball — they drowned when he didn’t have the ball in his hands. He also wasn’t an effective off-ball player in high school which adds another level of concern.

• While he generated an unbelievable amount of paint touches, Okorie’s rim finishing was highly questionable at just 51.9% in the halfcourt. The finishing package itself looks impressive with a variety of finishing looks, but they just don’t go down right now. While there’s an argument to be made that some of this comes down to volume and the lack of spacing, converting those looks will be key to hitting his theoretical ceiling.

• He’s just small — and defensively there are some questions, even with his 6’8” wingspan. Okorie fits right into a typical Nick Nurse system, as he will gamble for steals, and this gets him out of position sometimes. He’s not a Trae Young by any means on this end, but it’s hard to picture him being a net positive on defense without a bit more development.

Beckett’s Thoughts

Okorie is very similar to Jeremiah Fears from last year, who went in the top 10 with his ability to get in the lane and blow by people off the dribble. The star outcome is there as a player that is an elite ball handler and driver, capable passer and effective shooter. His subpar defense may hold him back a bit, but he’s not as bad as other small guards could be on that end with his length and effort. Back to the concept about upside swings from the previous articles in this series, Okorie has the biggest upside in my opinion of the guards who could possibly be available to the Sixers, while still holding a solid floor of a microwave scorer who can run bench units.

While I have Okorie above Philon in my overall board, he’s just barely below Philon for the Sixers’ specifically due to questions around his playmaking and off-ball fit next to Maxey and VJ. That said, the upside case is so enticing that I’d be happy to watch him try to figure it out.

Bennett Stirtz: Guard - Iowa

Profile

Height/Wingspan, Weight: 6’2.5”/6’6”, 182 lbs

Age: 22.7

25-26 Stats: 19.8 PPG, 4.4 APG, 2.6 RPG

Plays Like: Cam Spencer, Collin Gillespie

Old-school point guard who is capable of running an offense with efficient scoring and controlled playmaking — can he handle yet another jump in competition?

Pros

• Stirtz has excellent shooting touch both on and off the ball, making 37.2% from beyond the arc on 11.7 3PA/100, which even undersells his efficiency given the difficulty of his attempts. The windows he’s willing to shoot in are tiny, which should help it translate to the NBA level, and he’s comfortable both pulling up off the dribble and sprinting through off-ball screens.

• That touch translates to the rim as well — when he gets there, he’s converting an absolutely ridiculous 70.5% of his attempts. That is unheard of for an unathletic 6’3” guard, but it’s not a fluke; he’s crafty.

• Stirtz’s ball handling is not flashy but is effective. Compared to an Okorie or Philon, he’s not on the same tier, especially once he gets into the lane, but he can do enough to be on the ball consistently and doesn’t lose possessions to turnovers with his handle.

• His playmaking is strong based almost entirely on his elite basketball IQ, as he’s not making the flashiest passes, but consistently makes the right reads to keep the offense flowing without making mistakes (2.4 assist-to-turnover ratio). Stirtz is extremely methodical in the pick and roll, which he used to operate Iowa’s offense at a high level.

• Stirtz has been a clearcut number one option everywhere he’s been and he plays nearly every minute of the game with some of the best conditioning I’ve ever seen — a very fun fact is he averaged 40.3 minutes per game in conference play this year (for the less-consistent NCAA watchers, games are only 40 minutes). Stirtz was a winner at the DII level at Northwest Missouri St., then at Drake where he took them to a MWC championship, and then carried Iowa to the Elite Eight. It’s incredible how efficient he stayed even as he went up in competition levels from DII to Drake to Iowa.

Cons

• Stop me if you’ve heard this before: Stirtz’s athleticism caps his ceiling, particularly defensively. His change-of-direction is a bit more limited compared to other players that we’ve looked at in this range. Once the athleticism jump hits to the NBA, will he be able to handle it?

• While he typically at least tries on defense, he struggled anyway this year, which almost made it worse. There’s a chance he can exert more energy and physicality on this end when he’s not playing every single minute, but it will start off as a clear weakness. The screen navigation in particular was pretty brutal.

• Though he was a terrific rim finisher, he didn’t get to the rim very often to capitalize on it. He is likely going to need to rely more heavily on screens at the NBA level as his isolation game is more perimeter-based.

Beckett’s Thoughts

Stirtz is an older prospect and the ceiling isn’t as high for the potential of star outcomes, but it’s hard to picture him not translating. Shooting, ball handling, playmaking, and shot creation is a package that is hard to turn down and Stirtz combined that with elite efficiency on an extremely high workload. The defense isn’t there, but once you get past players where the upside is more confident, he’s a great option as a proven winner who should be able to run a second unit at minimum, with upside for a bit more.

Christian Anderson: Guard - Texas Tech

Profile

Height/Wingspan, Weight: 6’1”/6’6”, 180 lbs

Age: 20.2

25-26 Stats: 18.5 PPG, 7.4 APG, 41.5% 3P%

Plays Like: Payton Pritchard

The player often referred to as the best shooter in the draft, who balances his shot with elite-PnR playmaking, but may struggle against NBA size and physicality.

Pros

• He is a terrific shooter with extremely high volume and variety both off the catch and off the dribble. Anderson is likely the best shooter in the draft, which helps make up for his height issues, and he pulled from deep NBA range consistently. The pull-up shooting specifically is absolutely ridiculous, with 41.7% 3P% on five attempts per game. His shooting might be the single best individual skill of any guard outside the lottery.

• Anderson is an elite pick-and-roll operator — 97th percentile in PnR frequency and 93rd percentile in PnR scoring — with his shooting opening up the passing lanes as the defense overreacts. Great passer with both hands, and is effective at reading the help defense to evaluate where the ball should go.

• He’s a capable interior scorer even at his size. Not much of a rim scorer in general from a volume standpoint, though he converted well when he had chances. How well that translates to the league is a question, but he’s not averse to the basket.

Cons

• Say it with me: He’s just small on defense! Anderson does compete and try to play with physicality, and his wingspan is big enough that he could maybe be impactful if he fills out more. But he needs clear physical development and it could get ugly when he’s targeted on a switch at the NBA level.

• Anderson is not an iso player as he just wasn’t able to get by a defender on his own in college. Really needs pick and roll screens to run as a point guard versus shot creator. Those strengths fit the NBA but it caps his ceiling.

• He is a great playmaker, but can also get a little more risky than you’d like, averaging 3.3 turnovers per game. This was particularly the case on drives and once his co-star JT Toppin went down with injury, as Toppin helped fuel a lot of his easier playmaking opportunities.

Beckett’s Thoughts

Anderson is extremely enticing, with a terrific combination of on- and off-ball impact offensively as a shooter and playmaker, two skills that NBA teams put a premium on. However, he makes for a difficult evaluation, as he’s not going to do much outside of that, and it’s hard to picture where he could find defensive success.

Anderson seems like he could run a second unit and add elite floor spacing, which is a decent outcome at this point in the draft. The main worry is his lack of physicality impacting his ability to operate inside the arc on offense, and his offense is critical, given the defensive concerns. That said, if you hated the McCain trade so much that you want to just get him back, Anderson is where you should be looking, as he’ll add that same shooting gravity and scoring punch off the bench.

Meh Category

Meleek Thomas: Guard - Arkansas

Profile

Height/Wingspan, Weight: 6’3”/6’7”, 190 lbs

Age: 19.8

25-26 Stats: 15.6 PPG, 3.8 APG, 41.6% 3P%

Plays Like: Brice Sensabaugh, Grayson Allen

Haphazard bucket-getter who will need further development in his playmaking and defense to fully harness his dangerous shooting talent.

Pros

• Thomas’ biggest threat is elite perimeter shooting, at 41.6% from deep, and he is particularly deadly off the catch. The release is quick, with a smooth single motion that projects to translate – and he has good indicators, making 84.3% of his free throws and taking 9.6 3PA/100.

• He brings that three-point shooting to the open floor where he is aggressive and efficient both from deep and at the rim. Along with Acuff, he had a strong impact on Arkansas’ top-ranked transition offense.

• Didn’t make bad decisions with a 2.5 assist-to-turnover ratio. That didn’t mean he was a high-volume playmaker, as I’ll touch on more below, but he didn’t cost his team possessions either.

• He’s capable of playing both on and off the ball. Thomas came into Arkansas as a scorer, but was very willing and able to play off the ball with Darius Acuff and DJ Wagner this past year.

Cons

• Thomas has a lack of rim pressure for his profile that causes him to settle frequently for contested jumpers. A core driver of this is his subpar athletic explosiveness, but he also has the same issue as Edgecombe last year, where he picks up the ball a dribble too early on drives which can get him stuck.

• Defensively, Thomas is not as impactful. He struggles against strength and physicality, which is likely to be an issue given he will be more of a shooting guard than a point guard. He’s not a nothing on this end, leading the Razorbacks in steals (1.5 SPG), but he can get extremely inattentive off-ball.

• His playmaking is not there compared to these other guard prospects (8th percentile in assist rate), and like defense for big prospects, I prioritize playmaking more when evaluating guards. Thomas is a decent connective passer, which helps, but I wouldn’t love him running my offense as the primary or even secondary playmaker. It’s not helpful that he’s point-guard sized, but will need to play more as an off-ball guard.

• Thomas just plays out of control right now, rarely appearing on balance with or without the ball. For the NFL fans out there, he plays a bit like Isaiah Pacheco runs, which doesn’t translate quite as well to the basketball court.

Beckett’s Thoughts

As the secondary prize to Darius Acuff in Arkansas’ backcourt, Meleek Thomas projects similarly to Isaiah Evans as an elite shooter who may struggle to exert himself elsewhere. Thomas’ size is actually the best of any of the guards in this range, which would in theory project a fit better next to Maxey and VJ. However, the overall package and upside he provides isn’t quite as high, which drops him down my board. Thomas would be a decent target in a trade-down scenario, but No. 22 is a good bit too early for me — there will more than likely be better players on the board.

Other Names:

Sergio de Larrea

De Larrea has a first round grade for me as a good-sized guard (6’6”) who processes at a high level and adds strong three-point shooting (38.6% 3P%). His handle is a little bit loose and he lacks physical strength at only 175 lbs, which caps his ceiling as a primary point guard. However, he is terrific playing as a second-side creator, both with his shooting and attacking closeouts, and he is effective enough on defense with good effort and positioning. De Larrea feels like a player that will have a role at the next level, and would be a great target on a trade-down or with an early second-rounder. I’d honestly prefer him to Meleek Thomas if it comes down to it.

Ryan Conwell

Conwell is an elite shooter with the highest three-point volume of any player we’ve discussed in this series (17.5 3PA/100). He’s not a traditionally effective athlete, but he’s strong and I’m a fan of his deceleration and movement skills as a player that can translate. Even with his age and subpar height (6’2”, 6’7” wingspan) for his wing-style game, Conwell has a first-round ranking for me overall, and would be someone I run to get if he slips to the second round with his ability to help the Sixers from beyond the arc.

Richie Saunders

Saunders fits exactly what you’d look for in a competent NBA player with size (6’5”, 6’9” wingspan), shooting (41%+ on C&S threes over the last two seasons with high volume), feel, rebounding and defense. Why is he down here, then, you ask? He’s ancient by draft standards, at nearly 25 on draft night, has below-average athleticism measures, and is coming off of an ACL tear late in the season for BYU that will likely keep him out for much of next season. That said, once we get into the second round, I’m willing to take the swing on a player who appears ready-made to fit into an NBA rotation when healthy.

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This is the second of three articles breaking down my thoughts on every realistic option for the Sixers at pick No. 22 — check out my last article on the wings here and keep an eye out for the guard prospects (I know, I know…) coming soon.

As I mentioned in the wings evaluations, my primary goal is to look for the best player available, with a lean toward wings and bigs. Tyrese Maxey and VJ Edgecombe are my biggest concerns fit-wise, and I want whoever we take to work next to those two long-term, but if a player has a meaningfully higher ceiling than the next guy on my board, that wins out. Pick No. 22 is late enough that landing someone who plays well enough to earn a second contract is a good outcome.

I’m not evaluating anyone in the consensus top 12, given how unlikely they are to fall this far without a dramatic slide. That means Cameron Boozer, Yaxel Lendeborg, and Aday Mara are all not included in this piece. If by some miracle Lendeborg or Mara falls, run the card up to the podium and dance the night away, but the main focus should be on the players listed below (and even some of them are unlikely to last to our pick).

Read through the full player profiles on whoever interests you, or just skim the “Beckett’s Thoughts” sections to get a feel for where I have everyone and why. Let me know who you agree with or think I’m missing out on!

Dream Pick Category

Morez Johnson: Big - Michigan

Profile

Height/Wingspan, Weight: 6’9”/7’3.5”, 251 lbs

Age: 20.4

25-26 Stats: 13.1 PPG, 7.3 RPG, 1.1 BPG

Plays Like: Isaiah Stewart, Al Horford

A dominant athletic force whose motor runs at 100% at all times while adding additional skill flashes not often found in athletes of his level.

Pros

• Johnson is a defensive monster who will make an impact at either the 4 or 5 spot. He’s one of the players who is a tweener in a good way, with the ability to use his agility to defend forwards and his length/strength to guard bigs. Johnson was a core reason that Michigan was able to play their dominant three-big lineup with him, Mara, and Lendeborg, as he could both support Mara as a secondary rim protector and disruptive force at the 4 while taking over as the primary rim protector at the 5 when Mara was off the floor. His 7’4” wingspan lets him play far bigger than his listed 6’9” height.

• He was a terrific rebounder on both sides of the ball this past year at Michigan, but was even stronger as an offensive rebounder in his one year at Illinois before he was surrounded by other bigs at Michigan. He’ll make an immediate impact on the glass.

• Morez has an unbelievable motor and seems to find himself in the middle of every play. He would be a breath of fresh air amidst some of the other slow-moving players we have had on the Sixers over the last couple of years and would be able to threaten in transition as a rim runner next to Maxey and VJ.

• He’s a strong finisher, going hard to the basket and making 73% of his rim attempts on the season. This aggressiveness and physicality also earn him a ton of trips to the FT line, where he is an excellent FT shooter for a big man at 81%. This is his main scoring threat on offense at the moment.

Cons

• Johnson is not a shooter right now; let me just get that out of the way first as the most relevant point and as the reason that all these positive thoughts you’re about to read are in the “Cons” section. That being said, there are many positive indicators, particularly from his FT shooting efficiency and increasingly clean form. He took a massive jump in FT touch and willingness to attempt threes from his freshman year at Illinois to this past season, and I’m buying that the shot will develop into a capable threat at some point down the line.

• Johnson is not much of a playmaker currently, though he has shown some positive flashes. He is prone to just some silly throw-away passes, and while his physicality is awesome 99% of the time, it can lead to some turnovers on the occasion when he crosses the line.

Beckett’s Thoughts

Johnson is unlikely to make it to the Sixers as he seems to have been moving up draft boards quickly and into the lottery, but he is one of my favorite options if he is available. He doesn’t have the same superstar upside as some other players, but this is a player that every single team would benefit from having on its roster. He has an incredible combination of strength and agility, but pairs it with ancillary skills that you don’t often see in the physical forward archetype. I have him this high in part due to a bet in the shot developing, and the ceiling outcome would require that development, but he’s going to have a role in the NBA regardless of whether he can space the floor. Johnson would be a fan favorite the second he stepped on the floor.

Jayden Quaintance: Big - Kentucky

Profile

Height/Wingspan, Weight: 6’9”/7’5”, 253 lbs

Age: 18.9

24-25 Stats (at Arizona St): 9.4 PPG, 7.9 RPG, 2.6 BPG

Plays Like: Robert Williams III

A DPOY-level defensive prospect who dunks everything on offense and shows flashes of more — it all comes down to whether he’s healthy.

Pros

• Quaintance is an ELITE defender with a clear argument for being the best defender in the draft when he’s operating at peak level. His production on that end at Arizona St as a 17-year-old was unbelievable and had him in line to be a top-10 pick if he were eligible. He’s the most likely guy from this draft to win a DPOY at some point in his career.

• His rim protection has a strong case to be considered the best in the draft, and his excellent hand-eye coordination is a key driver of this when paired with his timing and length. Quaintance’s gargantuan 7’5” wingspan lets him impact a ton of actions as a drop defender, but he is effective in any scheme. He also has a super quick jump speed and is just a bundle of energy around the court that seems ready to explode at a moment’s notice.

• Not an elite switcher, but he can most definitely hold his own with his length and instincts. At Arizona St, he was very twitchy and moved his feet well to defend smaller players.

• Quaintance’s interior scoring is effective with 69% finishing at the rim, and he is physically very strong, which lets him generate those looks consistently. Most of his scoring is from being a roller or putback threat, and that is likely to be his main role at the next level. His physicality also draws a ton of FT volume, though he has struggled at the stripe, as we’ll get to below.

• Still extremely young even as a sophomore — he wasn’t allowed to declare last year because he had reclassified up a year in high school and he would have been a top 10 pick otherwise. The list of players who have been as impactful as he was at a young age is small, and he still has a ton of room for growth (or more importantly, to bounce back from his injury).

• He is an excellent rebounder on both ends of the ball and is capable of anchoring a lineup on the glass.

Cons

• Quaintance has big injury concerns, so it all comes down to the medicals. He’s coming off an ACL injury in February of 2025 and seemed to return to play too quickly at Kentucky, as he only played in four games before shutting it down with knee soreness. Last year was a complete wash for him with Kentucky, as he played just one healthy game (though it was against St. John’s where he dominated Zubi Ejiofor, who we’ll get to later) before eventually shutting it down for the year. It’s difficult to tell from the outside what his medicals look like, and that’s going to be the key determinant in his overall outcome.

• Offensively he’s more of a wild card outside of his rim finishing. Quaintance can struggle with playmaking and has a few too many turnovers (negative assist-to-turnover ratio). That said, his main evaluation is from Arizona St, where he was essentially running the offense, and the context of that team was horrendous. There are some flashes of other skills from that year, particularly with his ball handling to break less athletic bigs down off the dribble, but he’s not yet consistent enough there to count it as a strength.

• Not a shooter in the slightest. Can settle for some further touch shots where he’s less efficient on the interior rather than getting to the rim all the way at times. This hurts him the most though as a FT shooter, where he was under 50% from the line as both a freshman and a sophomore. That is the more important development than actual floor spacing given the FT volume he can generate with his physicality.

Beckett’s Thoughts

If you’re out on Quaintance, I completely understand. We’re looking to build around just Maxey and VJ right now solely because we drafted a big with injury concerns and are suffering the consequences. However, the only reason Quaintance is even possibly available at 22 is the injury concern, as he would have been a lottery pick last year as a 17-year-old and didn’t regress talent-wise. Players this young and talented are so difficult to acquire outside the top 10, and truly elite big-man defense is incredibly difficult to find, which makes it very hard for me to pass on him.

The injury concerns scare me (it is so hard to picture a Sixers’ success story when dealing with another injured player), but I can see us looking back in five years and saying, “That one injury was an outlier, and he should’ve easily been in the top 10 based on his age and production.” Continuing my thread from the last article, I’m aiming for the high-upside swings in this draft, targeting a long-term bet to put between Maxey and VJ, and there aren’t many, if any, better than Quaintance at this point in the draft.

Solid Selection Category

Allen Graves: Wing/Big - Santa Clara

Profile

Height/Wingspan, Weight: 6’8”/7’0”, 226 lbs

Age: 19.9

25-26 Stats: 11.8 PPG, 6.5 RPG, 41.3% 3P%

Plays Like: Robert Covington, offensively-oriented Collin Murray-Boyles

A bench player in a mid-major conference who has found himself in first-round talks thanks to dribble(ish)/pass/shoot capabilities and elite defensive playmaking.

Pros

• Graves is not a high-volume passer, but he makes the right read at all times and rarely turns the ball over. He has a terrific 2.5 assist-to-turnover rate, emphasizing his priority on turnover avoidance. He’s a particularly strong passer to cutters in the lane, which synergizes well with his offensive rebounding.

• He’s extremely disruptive defensively, with one of the highest combinations of blocks and steals in the country. In fact, Matisse Thybulle and Chris Manon are the only two other players to ever have both a block and a steal rate higher than 5%. Driven by his incredible hand-eye coordination and quick reaction speed, he is a monster off the ball.

• Graves is an excellent rebounder, ranking in the top 95th percentile in all of D1 on both sides of the ball. He generated high putback volume with that rebounding and was effective in scoring on his second chances.

• The perimeter shooting was very effective this year at 40.7% from beyond the arc, and he was more than willing to get them up. He’s confident taking shots, particularly off the catch (he loved pick-and-pop sets especially), and should be able to space the floor right away. However, I do want to caveat the 40%+ three-point efficiency with the fact that his volume (6.7 3P/100) and FT efficiency (75%) were just average, and he had a pretty slow release that needed to be assisted — he took only two off-the-dribble jumpers all year and missed both. He’s not an elite shooter right now, but he is capable and will be effective at spacing the floor off the ball.

Cons

• It’s a little weird to be talking about a player in the first round who came off the bench for most of the year in a mid-major conference. The competition in the WCC wasn’t great, though he did play well in their nine games against top-50 teams, and they do have a pro-esque system at Santa Clara with Herb Sendek — Jalen Williams and Brandin Podziemski are recent graduates in the NBA. However, Graves’ interior presence was more of a question against those stronger opponents, seeing a particular drop-off with his rim protection and rim finishing numbers.

• Though he made a ton of impact defensively off-ball with his blocks and steals, he isn’t a lockdown on-ball defender by any means, often struggling to keep ball handlers in front of him. He’s also extremely foul-prone and can get jumpy a lot of the time.

• The lack of speed is a bit tough to deal with given he’s probably more of a forward at the next level. The tweener label applies here, which can sometimes be good or bad. In this case, it’s bad as he’s a bit too slow for wings and too small for bigs. Will likely struggle to play small-ball five (which he played often in college) just because he can get bullied around by most centers, which ties back to the point about him struggling inside against some tougher competition.

Beckett’s Thoughts

Graves is a highly divisive draft prospect, as he is an analytics darling with metrics that put him closer to the top five in the draft as opposed to the Sixers’ range (tied for 4th nationally in the well-reputed BPM metric). Now obviously, that’s not the consensus on him, or he wouldn’t even be in this article, but it does represent the level of impact he was able to exert on the game throughout his time at Santa Clara, even off the bench. He’s a prospect with excellent feel on both ends and always seems to find himself in the right place to make a play happen.

His ceiling is a bit more capped compared to some other prospects, due to his just-decent scoring and his physical limitations (in all honesty, he probably should’ve been in the wings article, as that will fit his role more at the next level). However, he would be able to play for the Sixers right away and add a level of rebounding and feel that they desperately need.

Tarris Reed: Big - UConn

Profile

Height/Wingspan, Weight: 6’10”/7’4”, 264 lbs

Age: 22.8

25-26 Stats: 14.7 PPG, 9.0 RPG, 2.0 BPG

Plays Like: Not-old Andre Drummond

A dancing bear who combines physicality and a massive frame with impressive agility and feel.

Pros

• Reed has been one of the best rebounders in the sport on both sides of the ball, not only this past year but for all four years that he’s been in college. He has very soft hands and will make an immediate impact on the glass on both sides of the ball.

• The playmaking and feel are terrific for a big. His short-roll decision-making was excellent and played a big role in UConn’s ability to run its complex sets this year (which often run through the bigs). That comes with the caveat that some of the playmaking could be coming from his role in UConn’s offense, which creates a ton of clean passes, but his processing and ability to execute in that scheme were impressive.

• He is way more nimble than you would think for a guy his size, and he combines the quickness with great footwork that he used to cook several NBA prospects throughout the year. A combination of quickness/mobility and strength is very enticing and gives him an immediate role at the next level.

• Reed is effective as a rim protector with a strong block rate for his whole career, and he leverages his big 7’4” wingspan to be disruptive around the basket. He’s not quite as elite as some other players in this class, like Quaintance or Mara, but he is more than capable.

• Capable finisher — 69% at the rim on very high volume — and has great hands to corral any kind of pass on the interior to set up those attempts (no Adem Bona bricks-for-hands issues here). He is a great pick-and-roll threat, both because of that finishing and because of his excellent screen-setting, which uses his wide base to create a ton of space for the ball handler.

Cons

• Reed is not a shooter in the slightest, struggling both from the floor, where he barely attempted jumpers, and from the FT line, where he has hovered just above 60% over the last two years. He’s not going to be a floor-spacing threat at any point, and you’re just hoping for FT development if anything.

• Reed is an older prospect — what you see is what you get — and he only really started popping this past year at UConn in a program that often helps facilitate success. He wasn’t unsuccessful by any means in his first three years in college, but you’re seeing him at the end of his development in comparison to some other players in this range who are towards the start of theirs.

Beckett’s Thoughts

Reed would have had GMs salivating about 10 years ago — he’s the big man’s big man, controlling the paint and dominating with an impressive combination of strength and finesse. He has a clear case to be our backup center right away and would pretty much just be like turning back the clock on Andre Drummond. Is he going to be a starter at any point? Probably not. But he seems like he has a great case for a long NBA career given his strengths and feels exactly like the player that can be a spot starter if your main guy is out (for whatever reason that may occur; I certainly couldn’t picture that happening to the Sixers). Reed would be a pretty good selection at No. 22, but given his typical projected range is more towards the end of the first round, I would absolutely love him as a target to trade back and add some assets in the process.

Meh Category

Hannes Steinbach: Big - Washington

Profile

Height/Wingspan, Weight: 6’10”/7’2”, 248 lbs

Age: 20.1

25-26 Stats: 18.5 PPG, 11.8 RPG, 34.0% 3P%

Plays Like: Isaiah Hartenstein with less passing, Mo Wagner

A terrific rebounder who shows flashes of additional ancillary skills, but lacks the defensive chops to be a two-way force at the NBA level.

Pros

• Steinbach’s greatest strength by far is that he’s a terrific rebounder on both ends, with a concrete argument for the best in the draft. This complete dominance on the glass is a strong sell given the way that NBA teams have been focused on rebounding and the possession battle, especially this year.

• He is a good rim finisher, making 70.6% of his looks at the basket. He’s not typically an above-the-rim finisher, but he is effective at what he does with soft touch around the basket.

• Steinbach is a great screener, who creates a ton of space for his guards with a wide stable base. He was in a very tough situation in Washington, with poor spacing and a lack of strong guard play, which led to an inability to frequently leverage this skill. But he’ll be effective at the next level.

• Maybe shooting? Steinbach was a willing and capable shooter both from beyond the arc (34.0%) and at the FT line (75.9%). But he didn’t take a high volume (40th percentile in three point rate) and had some wild misses, which are often a negative sign in the long-term shooting evaluation. It seems like most evaluations have this built into his profile, but I’m not necessarily relying on this to be a major threat at the next level.

Cons

• He’s not a real threat as a rim protector, which is a difficult mold to be in for a starter unless you have some other special skills that let you overcome that weakness on the offensive end. His lack of vertical presence is a big issue here.

• On paper Steinbach is a “5”, but the play style is much more like a “4” at the NBA level. However, he can be a bit lumbering for a “4” — he just doesn’t have the quickness to be a forward, especially defensively.

• Playmaking doesn’t seem to be in the cards for him as currently constructed. He has shown flashes, but had a negative assist-to-turnover ratio and got in trouble against doubles (which he saw a lot of due to the lack of other threats on the Washington roster).

Beckett’s Thoughts

Steinbach profiles as more of a reserve big with a capped ceiling due to the lack of defense, which I personally put a heavy weight on when evaluating bigs. He will contribute somewhere as a backup (which isn’t a bad thing just to get some minutes) though I wouldn’t have him as high as I’ve seen him with a lottery pick in many mock drafts. I struggled with placing Steinbach between here and solid selection given his elite rebounding but the lack of rim protection is what ultimately cost him that spot. I wouldn’t be upset if he fell and the Sixers took him here, but I wouldn’t be strongly moved either.

Zuby Ejiofor: Big - St. John’s

Profile

Height/Wingspan, Weight: 6’7.5”/7’2”, 245 lbs

Age: 22.2

25-26 Stats: 16.3 PPG, 7.3 RPG, 3.5 APG

Plays Like: Xavier Tillman

A developed forward with impressive feel who lacks high-end athleticism, but plays with a motor that seems bound to earn him at least a rotation spot somewhere in the league.

Pros

• Zuby has been a terrific offensive rebounder all four years in college and makes a massive impact on that end of the floor.

• Outside of his rebounding, the playmaking and feel are the best selling points for Ejiofor. He was a genuinely strong playmaker this year, specifically as a DHO hub for St. John’s offense, while managing to keep his turnovers to a minimum. This was especially impressive given the poor context at St. John’s as they lacked any shooting/spacing threats throughout the year.

• Ejiofor has a strong motor and is not afraid of physicality which helps him get to the line frequently. He’s a non-stop worker and is constantly moving around the court with 100% effort.

• He is impactful defensively, though probably not a high-end primary rim protector at the NBA level. He would be at his best as a forward next to another strong rim protector who can support him.

• While his play strength is a bit lower than you would expect, Ejiofor has excellent footwork and agility for a big on the offensive end.

Cons

• Like several other bigs in this range, Ejiofor is an older prospect. There’s not as much room for development coming off his senior year and he’s already a bit below-average with his athleticism for an NBA big.

• Ejiofor is a bit of a tweener and doesn’t have the natural size to play at the “5” like he did at St. John’s. You’d need to play him primarily at the “4”, but his lack of athleticism is likely to hurt his defensive impact there, specifically with lateral movement. The inability to protect the rim as a primary big is the main reason he’s a tier below Tarris Reed, even with similar metrics otherwise.

• He has fine shooting touch coming off the best shooting year of his career, both at the FT line (71.8%) and from beyond the arc — though his 30.5% from three on 59 total attempts is not overly inspiring. However, given that he’s more than likely going to be a forward instead of a center at the NBA level, he’s not a strong threat to space the floor more than on the occasional catch and shoot.

• You’d expect the defensive rebounding numbers to line up with his offensive impact, but he’s just decent on that end of the floor, holding back some of his theoretical overall impact. Some of that does come down to him boxing out for the other St. John’s guards throughout the year, not all of it though.

Beckett’s Thoughts

Ejiofor is a great target for a trade-down pick if they’re able to get a pick later in the first round or trade back into the draft early in the second. The toughness and IQ provide the exact kind of play we’ve been missing out on with the Sixers’ rotation guys, and he seems like the kind of player that we see Boston or New York grab before they make us miserable every time we play them. That being said, when I’m evaluating an older prospect, I don’t want the top selling point for that prospect to be physical dominance over younger competition. He’ll probably have a role as a late depth piece given his hustle and playmaking chops, but I’d rather target that in a trade-down scenario than at No. 22.

Henri Veesaar: Big - North Carolina

Profile

Height/Wingspan, Weight: 6’11”/7’2”, 227 lbs

Age: 22.2

25-26 Stats: 17.0 PPG, 8.7 RPG, 42.6% 3P%

Plays Like: Jay Huff

A skinny, floor-spacing big, whose lack of defense is the main factor holding him back from rising up draft boards.

Pros

• Ahhh, a floor spacing stretch big at long last. Veesaar had a real bump in both volume and efficiency from deep this year, shooting 42.6% on 94 attempts, and he sports strong mechanics and a confidence that gives concrete belief in the shot. That said, there’s a small chance that this year was a flash in the pan as he was a late developer (~33% from three last season) and has struggled at the FT line this past year (61.5%... yikes). It’s likely that it translates, but the shot is an absolute necessity to his sales pitch as a stretch big which gives a little additional hesitancy to any bit of risk.

• He is a capable rim runner and balances his shooting against his rolls to the basket off of screens to keep opponents guessing. He converted an excellent 75% on those rim chances that he did have.

• Flashes of playmaking are there for sure, particularly hitting Caleb Wilson on cuts and lobs in the halfcourt. Good feel from a big is important in today’s NBA and Veesaar appears capable of holding his own with clean ball movement and the occasional true creation assist.

Cons

• Veesaar wasn’t super productive until his age-22 season this past year at UNC. There’s also not as much upside here, given the clear off-ball role and lack of usage at UNC — even after Caleb Wilson went down with injury — so it’s harder to see him becoming more than a good backup at the NBA level. These late bloomers are a bit tougher to evaluate against younger players in the same range.

• The play in the paint for Veesaar is a little more questionable at times than the overall numbers may make it look. He’s extremely light for a big at just 227 lbs, and when he was not able to exert his physicality he struggled, mostly aptly shown by his dip in efficiency in games against top-50 competition.

• His defense took a step back this year from Arizona, and he plays like more of a small-ball big or even a wing on that end. If you can get a defensive big next to him, he’ll be awesome, but the vision that’s being sold here is more of a stretch 5, which is a position I don’t know that he can truly play at the next level.

Beckett’s Thoughts

Veesaar is a tempting prospect given the value that stretch bigs are providing in the NBA with the premium that’s given to spacing. He draws dream Lauri Markkanen comparisons, as someone who spaces the floor at the 4 spot and is a capable secondary rim protector on defense, and Veesaar will need to have a similar offensive impact level to earn his place in the NBA. However, his shooting history and indicators don’t concretely project the perimeter efficiency he would need to hit to reach that Markkanen-esque outcome. Add in the subpar defense for a big and it’s hard to see a long-term role as an impact starter. He’ll likely be able to play, but I’d rather take either a bigger swing or a more proven two-way piece in this slot.

We Traded McCain for This??? Category

Chris Cenac Jr.: Big/Wing - Houston

Profile

Height/Wingspan, Weight: 6’10”/7’5”, 240 lbs

Age: 19.3

25-26 Stats: 9.5 PPG, 7.9 RPG, 0.5 BPG

Plays Like: Onyeka Okongwu before he got good at anything

A toolsy big with elite measurements and strong rebounding who needs development in every other area of his game to find a role in the NBA.

Pros

• Very athletic and extremely long with a gargantuan 7’5” wingspan. The tools are there for him to make an impact at the NBA level if he was able to add skill to it as well. He theoretically could project as a rim-protecting big with his size while also providing switchability given the solid mobility tools he has.

• Rebounding, particularly on the defensive side of the ball, is the main selling point for Cenac right now as the core skill. He was elite at cleaning up possessions for a team in Houston that relies on it heavily, using his length and physical tools to crash the boards.

• Every outside signal is that he is an incredible worker. Kelvin Sampson is a tough coach to choose to play for and he spoke to Cenac’s work ethic and willingness to be coached hard. If you’re going to take on a project like Cenac, you need to know they have the work ethic to maximize their potential at the next level.

Cons

• He has lots of potential but not a lot of production. Cenac is athletic as mentioned above, but is a slow leaper which limits his actual applicable athleticism. It’s the reason he only had 0.5 blocks per game this year, even with the incredible athleticism measurements mentioned above.

• Cenac has a HEAVY midrange diet while not being great at it, making just 43.3% of his non-rim twos. Shooting indicators in general also aren’t strong long-term, with just 62.1% efficiency at the FT line, in addition to subpar three-point numbers. The bigger issue though with his extremely heavy midrange diet is what it tells about his offensive approach which at the moment doesn’t leverage the physical gifts that he has, instead settling for inefficient contested jumpers.

• Defensively the flashes are incredible but he isn’t consistent enough and needs a ton of work to get there. Part of that consistency also comes down to effort, as he can see noticeable dips in his assertiveness and focus throughout the game.

• Cenac’s lack of feel shows up in his non-existent playmaking (negative assist-to-turnover ratio). He’s mostly looking to score when he gets the ball, but isn’t effective enough at it to be hunting his shot. He can also get a bit turnover-prone at times, which puts extra magnification on his lack of playmaking.

Beckett’s Thoughts

Cenac is just a player profile that is really hard to sell to me personally. So often we see players with high potential come in that are pitched as, “Oooh look at the physical tools he’s got, just wait for him to develop” and then they never develop to the skill level needed to actually be a productive NBA player. As just a rebounder with only theoretical potential for further offensive or defensive impact, he has no role on a legitimate team as currently constructed and will need a ton of G-League development to unlock his potential (which is likely that of a backup big). There’s an extremely narrow path that he could follow to get to an okay starter, but that’s a brutal target to be a first-round pick — I’m out on this one.

Other Names:

Most of these players are projected to be a little farther down the draft board towards the second round, but could be players to look at if the Sixers buy a pick or trade into the second round (if only Mike and I could be so lucky).

Trevon Brazile

Brazile has been a popular second-round sleeper as he is a vertically athletic and skilled big man (6’10” with a 7’4” wingspan) who you can get for cheap. The main reason he’s available is he’s a grandpa (24 years old — man is it depressing that this is grandpa age for basketball) and has an injury history with some recurring lower-body tweaks. That said, Brazile makes an impact defensively with some strong rim protection, adds capable floor spacing (35% on 328 attempts in his career), and may be one of the best lob threats in the country (which helps contribute to his elite 81% rim finishing efficiency). He is somewhat of a tweener, being a bit small for a 5 and a bit big for a 4, but the flashes are really enticing and worth a bet in the second round.

Ugonna Onyenso

Onyenso is an elite rim protector, and his profile lines up well with other strong traditional rim protectors out of the draft like Walker Kessler. Watch his ACC Tournament game against Duke, and you will immediately see the vision, as he dominates Cam Boozer in a way that not many people were able to do this season. He puts his 6’11” height and 7’5” wingspan to good use with a ton of lob dunks and offensive rebounding. However, outside of this and his defense, he does just about nothing else, which is why he’s a second-rounder and not highlighted earlier in the article. That said, Onyenso would step in and be a strong third big for the Sixers with the ability to develop into the backup big long term and seems like a player that’s just going to have a role in the NBA.

Izaiyah Nelson

Nelson is simply a dawg with a motor that consistently runs hot which lets him leverage his 6’8” height and 7’2” wingspan all over the court. He’s a menace defensively, blocking shots and getting in passing lanes with an impressive combination of horizontal and vertical athleticism. He also uses that physicality to generate a ton of interior pressure with extremely high rim and FT volume, both of which he converts at an above-average level. Nelson is on the older end of the class (22.7 years old) and is unlikely to ever develop any semblance of an outside shot, but as a second round swing, he would be enticing as an energy big off the bench to cause chaos.

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This is the first of three articles breaking down my thoughts on every realistic option for the Sixers at pick No. 22 — wings today, bigs and guards to follow. I’ve been doing draft scouting for a few years now and am excited about the opportunity to bring it to the Ricky; if you want to see how my takes on last year’s class aged, you can find that board here.

My primary goal is to look for the best player available, with a lean toward wings and bigs. Due to the age and injury-prone nature of Joel Embiid and Paul George, Tyrese Maxey and VJ Edgecombe are the only long-term cornerstones on this roster right now, and so everything else needs to be built around them. Fit matters — I want whoever we take to work next to those two long-term — but if a player has a meaningfully higher ceiling than the next guy on my board, that wins out. Pick No. 22 is late enough that landing someone who plays well enough to earn a second contract is a good outcome.

I’m not evaluating anyone in the consensus top 12, given how unlikely they are to fall this far without a dramatic slide. That means AJ Dybantsa (my personal top player in this class), Caleb Wilson and Nate Ament are all off the table here. It’s also worth noting that the departures of Thomas Haugh (returning to Florida) and Amari Allen (returning to Alabama) have meaningfully thinned the wing pool. Expect that to push some of the players below up real draft boards between now and draft night.

Read through the full player profiles on whoever interests you, or just skim the Reasoning sections to get a feel for where I have everyone and why. Let me know who you agree with or think I’m missing out on!

Dream Pick Category

Cameron Carr: Wing - Baylor

Profile

Height/Wingspan, Weight: 6’4.5”/7’1”, 184 lbs

Age: 21.5

25-26 Stats: 18.9 PPG, 37.4% 3P%, 1.3 BPG

Plays Like: Mikal Bridges, Trey Murphy

Do-it-all player who combines dangerous shooting volume and efficiency with terrifying athleticism — he just needs to get bigger.

Pros

• Carr’s strongest skill is his three-point shooting, combining high volume (10.6 3P/100 possessions) with real efficiency at 37.3% on a variety of shot types. He’s elite off the ball — 40.7% on catch-and-shoot attempts — but has shown comfort creating off the dribble as well. The form is smooth and repeatable, the kind you project with confidence.

• Leverages that shooting gravity well, attacking closeouts and getting to the rim and free-throw line as a result. His rim finishing sits in the 89th percentile across all of Division I, which is in part a testament to his length and athleticism.

• Dangerous transition weapon with a large jump in rim volume in the open floor. Extremely explosive — he has a wide variety of highlights catching lobs and throwing down poster dunks when he gets a step.

• Makes a bigger defensive impact than his listed height would suggest because of his 7’1” wingspan. Creates a ton of blocks for a non-big and is one of the better wing shot-blockers in the country. The length is real and shows up on both ends.

• Capable playmaker within the flow of the offense. Not a primary creator, but makes the easy pass, moves the ball on second-side actions, and doesn’t put it in harm’s way.

• Strong defensive rebounder who made a meaningful difference in Baylor’s overall rebounding numbers.

Cons

• Play strength is the main concern. Carr can get bumped off his spots and struggles to play through traffic at times. He plays hard and tough, but against stronger defenders, he can turn into a below-the-rim finisher at times. Most players add bulk as they age, but at nearly 22, he’ll need to make that a genuine priority at the next level or it will limit him.

• His lack of play strength has downstream effects on the defensive end as well. He impacts plays with his length and activity, but opponents who bring physicality to him can neutralize a lot of that. The defensive ceiling is tied to whether he can fill out.

• Not an advanced ball handler, though he can get where he needs to go. Like VJ this past year, he’ll need to show some improvement here to unlock more creation at the next level.

Reasoning

Some evaluators will have Carr in the guard category, but I believe in both his ability to play the wing and his fit next to Tyrese Maxey and VJ Edgecombe. His shooting gravity, length and off-ball movement make him a hand-in-glove fit alongside both of them — a player who spaces the floor, attacks the glass, and adds defensive disruption without requiring the ball. The fact that he’s shown flashes of on-ball creation at all three levels gives him a higher long-term ceiling than he’s typically credited with. This is the kind of player who doesn’t leave the lottery in a normal draft given how wide his skill range is. I’m not sure he makes it to 22 — his current consensus range is in the teens — but if he does, or if he gets anywhere close, it’s an easy call.

Dailyn Swain: Wing - Texas

Profile

Height/Wingspan, Weight: 6’6.5”/6’10”, 211 lbs

Age: 20.9

25-26 Stats: 17.3 PPG, 7.5 RPG, 3.6 APG

Plays Like: Skinny Franz Wagner, Jalen Williams, Naji Marshall

An elite ball handler and slasher for his size with a very high ceiling as an on-ball wing creator, but needs development when playing off the ball.

Pros

• Has a strong argument for being the best driver in this class at his size, which is what makes his ceiling so compelling. He shot 64.3% at the rim and 83% of those attempts were unassisted — he’s generating these looks himself, not just finishing off a teammate’s playmaking.

• The driving ability is rooted in an unusually advanced handle for a 6’7” wing. He dribbles low to the ground, can break defenders down off the dribble, and posted terrific isolation numbers. Ball handling at this size is the rare skill that gives him legitimate star-ceiling upside.

• Transition WEAPON. He generates extremely high rim volume in the open floor and converts it into free-throw volume as well, where he’s a strong 82% shooter. More controlled as a playmaker in transition than in previous years — he assisted on nearly 25% of Texas’ made baskets in the open floor while cutting down on his turnovers.

• Strong passer for his size. His ability to get into the lane gives him natural leverage as a playmaker, and he’s shown flashes as the ball handler in pick-and-roll, which opens a more expansive role projection at the next level.

• Excellent defensive rebounder, ranking in the top 5% of all Division I players. While he’s skinny, he isn’t a liability on the defensive glass, and his rebounding gives him opportunities to grab and go in transition.

• Defensive playmaker, particularly in passing lanes. He was excellent in that capacity at Xavier in his freshman and sophomore seasons; Texas saw a step back from that, but the tools are there if he puts in the effort to prioritize it.

Cons

• His shot is still a work in progress. Defenders at Texas were often comfortable helping off him beyond the arc and loading up to stop the drive, which both raises questions about his off-ball role and hurts his driving capabilities as defenders can sit back and give him space. The positive indicators are there — 82% FT% on high volume, 50% self-created midrange efficiency, and a decent 34.8% from three on just under three attempts per game — but the shot needs to develop for his off-ball value to fully materialize.

• Good playmaker for his size, but he can get turnover-prone in the halfcourt. The turnovers show up more in set offense than transition, and he is a bit loose with his processing in traffic.

• Swain’s mentality has been inconsistent. He didn’t impose himself as aggressively as you’d want given his profile this year at Texas — stretches of real assertiveness followed by long stretches of passivity. At his size with his tools, that aggressiveness needs to be a baseline, especially if you’re taking the swing with the hopes that he hits the ceiling outcome.

• Defensive effort and impact were more inconsistent at Texas with the heavier offensive load. His lack of strength held him back on that end, and while the environment explanation is partially there, you’d prefer to see the Xavier-level disruptiveness carry over regardless of context.

Reasoning

Swain is a higher-risk bet than Carr given the necessity of his shot developing and the fact that his off-ball fit is harder to project — his role at the next level will be a meaningful variable in whether he hits his ceiling. But the Sixers’ situation is a genuinely good landing spot for him. Picturing Swain’s playmaking and driving capabilities operating alongside Maxey and VJ, who can feast off the ball is a dream worth chasing at this stage of the draft. Given the class strength, I want to swing for the star outcome here, and Swain offers the most realistic version of that among the wings realistically available at 22. Give me the 6’7” ball handler who can generate off the dribble and playmake off his driving penetration any day. Along with Carr and a to-be-named big man target I’ll get to in the next article, he’s at the top of my list.

Solid Selection Category

Joshua Jefferson: Wing/Big - Iowa State

Profile

Height/Wingspan, Weight: 6’8”/6’11”, 246 lbs

Age: 22.5

25-26 Stats: 16.4 PPG, 7.4 RPG, 4.8 APG

Plays Like: Actualized Trendon Watford

A savvy passer and triple-double threat at his size, though limited athleticism and age cap what he can become.

Pros

• His main selling point is playmaking. Jefferson operated as the on-ball hub at Iowa State with some of the highest usage in the country and paid it off — 4.8 APG is exceptional for a power forward, and his feel and approach on those reads is the best part of his game. The idea of a playmaking big who can run the offense for stretches at the four is legitimately valuable.

• Excellent defensive rebounder who turns that into offense immediately. His grab-and-go threat was a central part of Iowa State’s attack. He runs the floor well for his size and either hits outlet passes to teammates or waits for lanes to open up with his own momentum.

• Good hands defensively, generating 0.8 blocks and 1.6 steals per game. His IQ is what gets him there as he finds his way into the right spots consistently. Capped athletically, but he made a strong impact within Iowa State’s aggressive doubling scheme.

Cons

• Jefferson is an adequate scorer, but it’s not a core skill. He can work into the mid-post with his bulk and has a usable baby hook and push shot, but he doesn’t consistently create his own advantages and shot just 51% at the rim in the halfcourt. Without the threat of the shot, opponents can play the pass more consistently.

• The playmaking quality that makes him interesting can also lead him astray. He gets a little aggressive at times and produces a few too many turnovers for a player who will need to run things efficiently in a reduced NBA role.

• Shooting is a real limitation. He did shoot 34.5% on 110 three-point attempts this past season, which shows development, but it still isn’t a strength. It won’t be respected in high-leverage moments, and the fact that he only ever shot off the catch makes the spacing question more acute. The form isn’t broken and his confidence has grown, but he needs it to keep developing to hold down a functional NBA rotation spot.

Reasoning

His age and limited athleticism cap his ceiling — what you see is essentially what you’re getting here. Jefferson is a better fit for a team already in contention than for a young core trying to project three years out around Maxey and VJ. He likely holds down an NBA rotation spot, which, all things considered, is a pretty good outcome at pick 22, but there are players in this range I’d prefer given their room for growth. However, if he does end up in Philly, he’ll help the halfcourt execution immediately, and the playmaking at the four is genuinely useful. I wouldn’t be upset with the pick, assuming other players are off the board.

Isaiah Evans: Wing/Guard - Duke

Profile

Height/Wingspan, Weight: 6’5.5”/6’9”, 186 lbs

Age: 20.5

25-26 Stats: 15.0 PPG, 36.1% 3P%, 15.6 3P/100

Plays Like: Jordan Hawkins, Isaiah Joe

Extremely skinny off-ball shooter who will space the floor from day one, though his high-end outcome is somewhat capped.

Pros

• Shooting, shooting, and more shooting! Evans has an argument for the best off-ball shooter in this draft, posting the second-highest three-point volume among projected top-40 picks behind Ryan Conwell. His feel for how to move without the ball to create clean looks is elite, with precise footwork setting up releases, excellent timing off screens, and quick release speed. All of it translates.

• Loved functioning as the screener in inverted pick-and-roll actions with Cam Boozer at Duke and benefited greatly from the playmaking those actions generated. He knows how to manufacture good looks within a system without needing the ball in his hands.

• Excellent off-ball cutter with the athleticism to finish better at the rim than you would expect, both in the open floor and in the halfcourt. More of a sneaky athlete than his frame suggests.

Cons

• Extremely thin frame. He played bigger than his weight at Duke, but that doesn’t mean he played strong. He’ll likely be a mismatch target on the defensive end and can get bullied in situations where physicality is imposed on him. He’s very similar to Isaiah Joe in this way, where he’ll compete, but it often doesn’t matter to the outcome of the possession.

• Limited playmaking and minimal counters when run off the three-point line. Around two-thirds of his shot attempts were threes — when he couldn’t get one up, he’d reset rather than create inside the arc. Not a shot creator in any meaningful sense.

• More inconsistent off the dribble. That’s not what you’re counting on from him at the next level and ideally not the role he’s playing, but it does cap his ceiling as a secondary creator.

Reasoning

Most picks at 22 don’t become stars, and Evans isn’t a star bet. But if you’re looking for a concrete contributor who will at minimum eat useful minutes in the regular season, he fits that bill confidently. You could argue he’s more of a guard than a wing, but the off-ball movement and shooting will create real gravity at the next level regardless of what you call him. He’s always on the move, always contributing to offensive flow, and has won at every level he’s played. Once the higher-upside bets are off the board, Evans is a welcome addition.

Meh Category

Koa Peat: Wing/Big - Arizona

Profile

Height/Wingspan, Weight: 6’7”/6’11”, 245 lbs

Age: 19.4

25-26 Stats: 14.1 PPG, 5.6 RPG, 2.6 APG

Plays Like: Rui Hachimura without the shot, Jarace Walker

A physical forward who plays hard and has good feel, but doesn’t add enough on either end of the floor right now.

Pros

• Physicality and play strength combined with real quickness is a compelling combination, especially for someone as young as Peat is. He physically dominated a lot of opponents throughout the year, which shows up in his 67% rim finishing efficiency.

• Generated a ton of free-throw volume thanks to his physicality — top 10th percentile in Division I in FT volume. The 62% efficiency at the line is ugly, but the contact drawing ability is real.

• Cutting is arguably his best offensive skill. It was especially useful in Arizona’s scheme, which operated with one of the lowest three-point rates in the country and heavily crowded the paint. Peat’s feel for timing his cuts within that environment is a good sign for his basketball IQ.

• That feel shows up in his playmaking too. Peat is not typically making advanced reads, but he was particularly adept at Arizona’s high-low actions and finding the open man on short-roll 4-on-3s. Makes the correct simple read in most cases.

• Effective offensive rebounder and putback threat. Some of that is scheme-driven — Arizona was one of the most prolific offensive rebounding teams in the country — but the instinct is real.

• Defensive potential is there even if it isn’t fully actualized yet. The strength and quickness are good tools for on-ball defense at his position, and he’s a winner who competed hard throughout the year.

Cons

• Peat is a complete non-shooter. He attempted fewer than 5% of his shots from three, and the form needs a complete rework. This is unlikely to become a reliable weapon in high-leverage moments, which is a devastating limitation for a forward in the modern NBA.

• He settled for a ton of midrange attempts at subpar efficiency — 35% on non-rim twos. These are not shots teams will want him taking at the next level, and without a three-point threat to fall back on, these become his only other scoring option outside of getting to the rim.

• Peat struggled against real size, most aptly demonstrated in Arizona’s disappointing Final Four game against Michigan. He could bully players smaller than him in lesser matchups but got blocked frequently and couldn’t generate the same advantages with as much regularity against NBA-caliber length.

• He often lost the advantages his cuts created and had to settle in the midrange. His fallback on drives was typically a spin move into a post fade, which he leaned on too heavily. Some of this is scheme context at Arizona, but it’s a pattern worth flagging.

• Peat has questionable off-ball awareness on defense. He lost focus too often and was forced to lean heavily on Motiejus Krivas anchoring the back line.

Reasoning

If he could shoot even a little, Peat would be an inspiring prospect. But he can’t, and the midrange game (which he isn’t even good at) isn’t a real substitute at the NBA level for a forward. The feel and athleticism combination is useful, but I keep struggling to see a concrete fit given the shooting limitations. I went back and forth between this tier and the one below before landing here (a feeling that may still shift before draft night). A rotation-caliber body isn’t the worst thing in the world this late in the draft, and to be fair, the Sixers are a team that genuinely needs toughness and someone who competes. However, the path to a meaningful playoff role with this shooting profile is narrow. I’d convince myself to like him, I’m sure, but I really don’t want to have to.

We Traded McCain for This??? Category

Karim Lopez: Wing - New Zealand Breakers

Profile

Height/Wingspan, Weight: 6’8”/6’11.5”, 222 lbs

Age: 19.2

25-26 Stats: 11.9 PPG, 6.1 RPG, 1.9 APG

Plays Like: Ousmane Dieng, Tidjane Salaun

A physically impressive but extremely raw forward who shows flashes of driving capability but will need significant development time before his theoretical ceiling becomes real.

Pros

• Lopez’s biggest selling point is that he’s very physical and strong for his age. He uses that strength to chisel into defenders and create space near the rim on his drives. Toughness translates and has been key for many teams in the playoffs this year, and Lopez has been doing it in a professional league in the NBL.

• That physicality lets him drive through contact. The drives aren’t advanced — he’s mostly using his strength to bump defenders off his line or draw fouls — but he’s particularly effective attacking closeouts, which adds to the importance of his shooting development (see below).

• He has a good enough feel to make the easy read as a secondary playmaker. He won’t create his own advantages, but as a slasher and cutter he can find the right pass when it’s directly in front of him.

• Capable rebounder on both ends. He carries his own weight on the glass without being a standout.

Cons

• Like Peat, he’s just not an effective shooter right now. Lopez is capable when stationary and with time, but inconsistent enough that NBA defenses will help off him immediately. The form isn’t broken, which gives it some chance at development, but this is a critical development area given how much of his offensive game relies on defenders respecting the shot.

• He has a very shaky, loose handle that often makes it so he has to capitalize on advantages created by others. He relies heavily on a spin move when cut off on drives and turns it over more than you’d like as a result.

• His little bit of feel is lost in the open floor with poor transition decision-making. He’ll try to go coast-to-coast off rebounds but struggles with both the read and the conversion. For a player with his physical profile, that’s a major missed opportunity.

• Lopez’s defensive performance is worse than his size and strength would suggest. He gets caught flat-footed, blown by on the perimeter consistently, and loses focus off-ball. High hips as an on-ball defender will cause issues on switches. Projects to guard only threes and fours.

• Has some tools to add off the ball, but he plays like he wants to be on the ball, which will absolutely not be his role at the NBA level.

Reasoning

This is a long-term developmental bet on one of the youngest players in the draft. I can get there on a raw prospect if the defensive floor is solid enough to buy time while the offensive game catches up (or vice versa), but Lopez doesn’t provide that. The shooting is unproven, the handle is shaky, and the defensive effort and positioning are already concerns at the professional level.

It reminds me of the Noa Essengue situation from last year’s class: young, physically promising, genuinely interesting tools and ultimately a profile that has burned evaluators more often than it’s paid off. He’s more than likely heading straight to the G-League for at least a year out of the draft, regardless of where he goes. This is not the bet I want to make as our reward for suffering through the next decace of Jared McCain on OKC.

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Watching the playoffs right now feels like watching a completely different sport than the basketball the Sixers spent all season trying to play (even beyond the 7’5” alien that Spike and AU seem strangely upset over — yes Victor Wembanyama is that good, he deserves the praise he is getting). Every contender left standing has waves of players who can dribble, pass, shoot, defend, make quick reads, survive physicality and seamlessly slot into whatever the game demands. The ball flies around the court. Rotations tighten. Weaknesses get attacked instantly.

Meanwhile, the Sixers spent most of the season trying to survive off star power, isolation scoring, and hoping enough minimum-contract specialists could duct tape the rest together.

Daryl Morey getting fired immediately after the Celtics series has painted him as the clear scapegoat for the team’s issues, which is understandable. A lot of what’s gone wrong the past few years has Morey’s fingerprints all over it. The three-star roster construction philosophy. The constant cycling through niche role players. The obsession with theoretical optimization over functional playoff basketball.

But this wasn’t just a Morey problem.

Nick Nurse coached this team the way he always does: with a system heavily reliant on stars creating advantages in isolation while role players filled extremely narrow responsibilities around them. Ownership played its role too, consistently prioritizing star-driven marketability and financial flexibility over depth and team success.

As a unit, the front office, coaching staff, and ownership have actually had a remarkably unified front this year, which honestly might be their most shocking accomplishment given the lack of cohesion we’ve seen throughout the organization since the Sam Hinkie days. The problem is that everyone was aligned behind a philosophy that feels a lot closer to those Sam Hinkie days than where basketball actually is right now.

Modern playoff basketball is less about what you do well and more about what you do poorly that opponents can expose. If one player can’t shoot, teams ignore him. If one player can’t defend in space, he gets hunted every possession. If your offense depends entirely on difficult isolation shotmaking, playoff defenses eventually suffocate it.

The Sixers have often built the opposite, accumulating specialists instead of complete playoff players. On paper it could sometimes look like depth, but in reality it was usually just individual skills disconnected from one another. Jabari Walker can rebound but not defend. Dominick Barlow can defend but not shoot. Adem Bona can protect the rim (sometimes), but fouled constantly and seemed unable to catch the ball when it was passed to him. That’s all a bit of a simplification, but the truth is that the best teams in the league have more-well-rounded players with multiple skills that they can leverage to make a difference in short bursts, even against playoff-level competition.

The disconnect shows up even further in the players the Sixers have let go, who are actively contributing for the two best teams in the sport (seriously, watch this Thunder vs Spurs series if you haven’t been already, it’s incredible basketball). We lost Julian Champagnie in February of 2023 — who can both shoot AND rebound by the way, wonder who could have used help with the latter — for the sole purpose of seeing Mac McClung win the dunk contest in a Sixers uniform. We cut Isaiah Joe in October of 2022 to save a little extra guaranteed money. And then of course, there is Jared McCain.

While the value we got for McCain is the highest (some picks are better than nothing), he is still the cleanest example of the overlapping weaknesses between the front office, coaching staff and ownership. Everyone has seen the “We sold high” clips somehow still going around 3.5 months later, and I won’t deny that Morey dug himself a hole in that press conference. But this was on everyone.

Nurse didn’t want to play McCain because he didn’t fit into the star-focused, iso-ball offense and athletic, turnover-focused defense that Nurse prefers. Morey didn’t mind the roster loss because he wasn’t able to effectively quantify the importance of team dynamics and the personality/work ethic of McCain (even beyond the fact that he was still returning from a meniscus injury, as they themselves stated throughout the year). Ownership played a part too, because they wanted to duck the tax and save money in some way as opposed to truly prioritizing the depth and talent of the team. Three different branches of the organization, all arriving at the same flawed conclusion for different reasons.

Now I’m not going to sit on my high horse and say that these are franchise-altering decisions or that they would have changed the outcome of the Knicks series. When you get swept with an average scoring margin of over 22 points per game, you’re more than one or two minor roster moves on the margins away from truly contending. But the players the Sixers have lost are exactly the types of players modern playoff basketball keeps rewarding. Not because they’re stars. Because they play hard, move the ball, process quickly, embrace roles, and contribute to cohesive team basketball.

Grit, mindset and a willingness to put forth the requisite effort to win no matter what it takes are all outside of the stat sheet, and that’s a reason players like McCain, Champagnie, and Joe have all been able to contribute for other teams after being deprioritized by the Sixers. Each individual loss can be explained away. What’s concerning is how consistently the Sixers have kept making the same type of mistake. The margins matter now more than ever, even if they’re harder to quantify cleanly.

That’s why firing Morey alone probably won’t fix this on its own. Because unless the entire organizational philosophy evolves — from ownership, to the front office, to the coaching staff — the Sixers risk spending the next few years trying to perfect a version of basketball the rest of the NBA already left behind.

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The one time. The one time I actually didn’t have expectations going into a season.

The Sixers were coming off a 24-58 season of absolute misery that somehow earned them the gem that is Valdez Drexel Edgecombe Jr. For once, the season felt untethered from the usual pressure. No one looked at this team like a contender. No one even pondered the possibility of a playoff run. We were just happy to be there and see what a young and exciting backcourt of Tyrese Maxey, VJ, and Jared McCain (long may he reign) could mean for the future.

And we got exactly that. VJ exploded for 34 points in an opening-night win in TD Garden, earning “Boston Strangler” comps to the great Andrew Toney in his first-ever NBA game. It didn’t stop there either. Throughout the season, we got flashes of what VJ Maxx (we still desperately need a better nickname) could become with their absurd open-floor speed and athleticism.

There were highlights and lowlights that come with any Sixers season, with Paul George’s 25-game suspension and Joel Embiid’s injury-plagued moments of brilliance leading the way. Still, through it all, I managed to keep a lid on any semblance of attachment to playoff success. I even wrote an entire piece dedicated to telling as many people as possible not to fall for it. Even at their best, the Sixers did not look like a team that fit the mold of a real playoff contender, no matter how many flashes they showed.

But then they went and beat the Celtics.

I managed to keep my expectations down at first. I knew Boston was a brutal matchup before the series even started, and the 3-1 hole they dug themselves into did absolutely nothing to change that sentiment. I loved VJ’s and Maxey’s performances in Game 2 and was content with the playoff experience we had gotten for our exciting young rookie. Game 5 felt like a flash in the pan of something greater with the defensive close in the fourth quarter, but even that I brushed aside as outlier shooting luck from Boston. I absolutely abhorred the thought of losing to the Celtics again, but I knew this wasn’t the year, and I could live with the outcome.

Game 6 though… Game 6 showed the vision of what this team could truly be.

The talent was obvious, sure, but more importantly, they finally matched it with the effort and intensity required to survive playoff basketball. For stretches, they looked like a team that could actually compete with anyone in the league when fully locked in. And that was the shocking part. The physicality. The desperation. The willingness to throw themselves into every possession in a way we honestly haven’t consistently seen over the course of the entire Process Era. I didn’t fully buy in — how could I after years of disappointment every time I let myself believe — but it started taking actual effort not to get swept up in it again.

Which brings me to the first thing I probably should have seen coming in retrospect: the Sixers actually won.

The dreaded Celtics were finally vanquished. The Sixers beat a genuinely good playoff team for the first time in 15 years. All it took was none of us expecting it — “a watched pot never boils” and all that. We were just there for the ride, enjoying the little things, and somehow the team responded with the first 3-1 comeback in franchise history.

For a brief moment, the weight was gone. The cynicism disappeared. The jokes disappeared. We weren’t waiting for the collapse anymore because they had already survived the part where the collapse was supposed to happen.

And naturally, that’s exactly when things became dangerous again. Because once the expectations came back, the Sixers became the Sixers again too.

With a trip to the conference finals on the line, the East more open than it has been in years, and belief fully creeping back into the fanbase, the Sixers reverted right back to who we thought they were. Not only were they summarily swept by the Knicks, but the effort they put forth was bad enough that there should have been an entire podcast episode of Mike’s “Embarrassed” song on loop. New York was so dismissive about the matchup that they effectively turned Xfinity Mobile Arena into “Madison Square Garden East,” and by the end of the series Josh Hart was openly questioning the sports fandom of Philadelphia as a whole. The series went so poorly that the Sixers organization went from “maybe this core deserves another shot” to firing Daryl Morey in the span of about ten days.

The cruel irony of this season is that the Sixers finally succeeded the moment nobody expected them to. The pressure disappeared, the fear disappeared, and the team responded with the biggest playoff breakthrough of the era. But the second expectations returned, so did all the old habits. Maybe that’s a coincidence. Or maybe this franchise has spent the last decade proving it handles freedom a lot better than pressure.

The lesson here may be simple: never trust the Sixers once they give you a reason to trust them. Enjoy the vibes, enjoy the chaos, enjoy VJ doing something absurd in transition, but the second you start opening Basketball Reference to map out conference finals matchups, the Sixers are more than ready to lose by 30+ on another Mother’s Day elimination game. This team can smell optimism and always knows just how to take advantage.

The one time we went into a season without expectations ended up producing the most emotionally confusing playoff run of the entire Process Era. The Sixers finally beat the Celtics, reignited belief across the city, and then immediately reminded everyone why we were trying not to believe in the first place. We should have known all along.

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Let’s not do that one again, please.

The Sixers walked into Madison Square Garden last night with the swagger of a team coming off their best playoff win in the last two decades and were promptly punched in the mouth. They looked like they were playing a regular-season game and seemed surprised when the Knicks were not.

Let’s be clear: the Sixers were at a severe rest disadvantage for this one, coming off a grueling, down-to-the-wire Game 7 on Saturday, while the Knicks last played on Thursday in a game where their starters were done at halftime (they were up 72-22 in the second quarter!). That could end up explaining a lot of the malaise the Sixers appeared to be under throughout the night. However, I didn’t like what I saw from a game plan and execution standpoint either, which makes this more concerning than a simple scheduled loss.

Offensively, the approach left a lot on the table, most notably in failing to consistently target New York’s weakest defender: Jalen Brunson.

The Sixers showed extremely limited interest in going at Brunson, especially in the first half, which allowed him to hide in the corner on defense and then absolutely torch whoever was guarding him on the other end. According to NBA tracking data (Figure 1), Brunson spent most of his time defending Kelly Oubre Jr. and Quentin Grimes, and was rarely forced to switch onto the Sixers’ big three of Joel Embiid, Tyrese Maxey and Paul George. The few times the Sixers did attack him, they were successful — posting a 62% effective field goal percentage — but they didn’t do it nearly enough to drive real offensive success.

Figure 1: Jalen Brunson was able to avoid tough matchups on defense for most of the night and save his energy for offense instead. Source: databallr.

This happened in part because of a heavy reliance on Embiid-focused offense. That works against a team like Boston, where the weakest defenders are their bigs. That is not the case against New York, where the pressure point is Brunson — and to a lesser extent, Karl-Anthony Towns if you can force him to move laterally. They need to get their guards more involved and force Brunson into actions at every possible opportunity.

The other major offensive issue was turnovers, both volume and type. The Sixers posted a higher turnover rate than in any of their games against Boston in the last series, outside of the disastrous Game 1 blowout. More importantly, many were live-ball turnovers that directly fueled New York’s transition attack, where they scored an absurd 1.60 points per possession off steals.

What’s frustrating is that this hasn’t been a constant problem against New York. The Sixers were much better at taking care of the ball in their first three matchups, all of which were wins or competitive games. But they’ve struggled badly in the last two — both blowouts. Turnovers are shaping up to be a massive swing factor in this series. The Sixers have the personnel to clean it up — Maxey’s four turnovers in limited minutes were particularly uncharacteristic — but they simply cannot afford more games like this from a ball security standpoint.

Defensively, the issues were a bit more nuanced, but just as damaging.

They lacked the same attentiveness that defined the final stretch of the Celtics series. I won’t say effort wasn’t there — they played hard, especially early — but it often crossed into playing out of control. And when you’re out of control defensively, effort quickly turns into mistakes. The Sixers gave up easy looks by losing back cutters, getting caught flat-footed on closeouts, and then overpursuing closeouts to leave drivers wide open.

Now up to this point, the case has leaned toward this being more schematic than fluky — a real disadvantage, even if it’s one that the coaching staff can adjust for. But there were also some clear outlier elements, particularly in New York’s shooting.

Before garbage time, the Knicks shot 58.3% from three and 73.3% on midrange attempts, both in the 100th percentile for any NBA game this season. The Sixers were bad, but they weren’t THAT bad. If you’re looking for reasons to believe this game won’t repeat itself, this is the strongest one by a long shot.

Be that as it may, I wouldn’t rely on shooting regression entirely. Part of the concern is that the Knicks still generated clean looks. They won’t shoot like this again — if they do, this series will be over quickly and the Knicks are rolling to the title — but the Sixers gave up too many open shots for comfort. The other part is that not all of New York’s success is subject to shooting variance. At the rim, the Knicks shot 73.9% compared to just 58.8% for the Sixers on similar volume. That gap is about physicality, positioning and offensive approach, not just luck.

There’s also a larger trend worth noting: the Knicks appear to be figuring out the Sixers’ defense more with each matchup. Their offensive efficiency has increased in every game against Philadelphia this season (Figure 2), culminating in the blowout performances we’ve now seen.

Figure 2: The New York Knicks have gotten more efficient on offense in each game this year against the Philadelphia 76ers, leading to their recent blowout victories. Source: Cleaning the Glass.

A big part of that may come down to Karl-Anthony Towns pulling Embiid and the Sixers’ rim protection away from the basket. When Embiid is forced to defend in space, the entire structure behind him starts to crack. The Sixers need to either adjust how they’re handling that matchup defensively — like hiding Embiid on Josh Hart and praying he doesn’t shoot 45% from three again — or punish it more consistently on the other end when KAT is at the five.

This inability to get stops had a cascading effect as well. The Sixers were constantly taking the ball out of the net, which killed any chance at building a transition offense — one of the clearest weaknesses for the Knicks, who rank 25th in transition defense. You can’t exploit a weakness if you never get the opportunity to run.

All that said, I’m not going to say they can’t turn this around. If these issues were obvious from the outside, they were certainly obvious to a coaching staff paid to diagnose them. And while some elements of the Knicks’ shooting could sustain, this level of efficiency is not. There are also the classic playoff truisms: the series doesn’t start until the road team wins, and each game counts the same regardless of margin. We’re one round removed from Boston winning multiple games by 30+, including the series opener, and the Sixers winning the series anyway. Swings happen.

However, a repeat of this approach — both schematically and in terms of execution — is not tenable if the Sixers want to make this series competitive. We’ll have plenty of time in the offseason to cherish our first-ever victory over a good playoff team in the Process Era. But the Sixers need to move past it and make real adjustments now if they want a chance at another one.

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The Sixers exist to push us into the depths of despair… so it was only right that they put together one of their best games of the season when down 3-1 to ignite the sparks of hope once again. Most prognosticators (myself included) didn’t think going in that this series would go past five games, but now they’re just two wins away from pulling off the greatest series victory of the Process Era — and somehow, against all better judgment, it feels at least a little more real after last night. That’s how they get you.

We know the obvious reason for the wins and losses: the Celtics live and die by the three, and so far they have died twice and lived thrice (26.9% from three in losses this series and 41.7% in wins), and in many ways, it really is that simple. The problem is the Sixers can only do so much about that — three-point shooting can be notoriously fickle regardless of defensive effort — and the Celtics are an elite shooting team overall, so the Sixers likely have to win at least one game where Boston gets hot again from deep. Relying purely on Celtics shooting variance is less a strategy and more a prayer.

So where else have they been able to make up the difference, and how can they leverage it into another win in Game 6?

Defensive rebounds are one clear area, as expected coming into the series, though the reason may not be quite what you think. Of course, the rebounding overall has been brutal, as the Sixers have allowed the Celtics to grab over 40% of their misses (10th percentile) in Games 2-4, and the Sixers have only been above average on the defensive glass in their Game 5 win on Tuesday. Now you might be saying to yourself: “Well the Sixers won Game 2, so how did they pull that off while still giving up a boatload of second chances?” The key (outside of the aforementioned three-point shooting) is what they allow Boston to do with those second chances.

In the Sixers’ three losses, the Celtics absolutely shredded them on putbacks, scoring after offensive rebounds at rates of 1.25 points per possession (PPP) in Game 1, 1.40 PPP in Game 3, and 1.20 PPP in Game 4, all well above average. This is why every bucket off of an offensive rebound feels like an absolute dagger — because, statistically speaking, it basically has been. However, in their two wins, the Sixers have been able to hold the Celtics’ putback scoring to just 0.83 PPP in Game 2 and 0.56 PPP in Game 5, both excellent numbers.

As much as I would love to say otherwise, it’s probably too much to ask at this point for the Sixers to become a good defensive rebounding team in general. We’re too far into a season of lackluster effort ending possessions, and Boston is a brutal matchup on the glass. But if the Sixers can sharpen their focus after the offensive rebounds they will inevitably allow — staying attached to shooters, avoiding scramble breakdowns, and limiting the actual damage of those second chances — then they might have a real shot. They do not need perfection here. They just need the rebounds they lose to stop instantly becoming backbreaking.

This commitment to hanging back and cleaning up possessions could cost them some transition opportunities, but honestly, that may be a tradeoff worth making, because the other notable win condition for the Sixers is leaning harder into their halfcourt offense.

The Sixers’ offensive execution in their two wins has been excellent, and it has relied almost exclusively on 95th percentile scoring in the halfcourt. In fact, in those wins, Philadelphia has simply been more efficient in the halfcourt than in transition, which feels surprising at first until you remember just how good Boston is at limiting both the volume and efficiency of open-floor chances — something Sixers’ fans will be all too familiar with from the seemingly dozens of times Derrick White or Jordan Walsh have broken up clean-looking transition opportunities.

When the Sixers can slow the game down and execute, it allows them to set their defense more effectively, which reduces transition cross-matches, which then also helps limit offensive rebound chaos. One clean possession can prevent three future problems, which for this team is about as close to stability as it gets. It all links together. Isn’t basketball so fun?

This is still a deeply dangerous game to play as a Sixers fan. Hope has historically been the first step toward emotional ruin. No, the Sixers aren’t suddenly favorites. Yes, Boston’s shooting could still erase all of this in one avalanche quarter. But this series has shifted from “please don’t embarrass yourselves” to “wait… is there actually a chance?” If the Sixers can keep controlling what is in their power — halfcourt precision, defensive discipline after misses, and enough mental resilience to survive the inevitable Celtics shooting barrage — then maybe this dream isn’t dead just yet. And honestly, what’s the Process Era without one more completely unnecessary emotional investment?

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So it’s the Celtics again.

I’m not like Spike in his apparent apathy towards the Celtics. Growing up in Philly, there is a distinct hatred towards the Celtics that’s built into your childhood — and that was before I went to school in Boston the year the Celtics won the championship. So it would mean a great deal to me if the Sixers could bump their playoff series record over the last decade to 1-3 instead of 0-4 in this particular matchup.

Is that likely? No. Honestly, I’m not even sure it’s possible. Fair warning, I’m going to have to crush some hopes and dreams here first before I try to find some optimism. But every game counts, so let’s see if we can outline what the Sixers can do to make this series at least look competitive.

Now you might be a little doubtful of my pessimism, so let’s start first with why this matchup is so challenging in the first place.

For starters, the Celtics are just significantly better than the Sixers, even regardless of the availability of Joel Embiid, ranking fourth in the NBA in net rating (+8.4) and sitting in the top five in the league in both offensive and defensive efficiency. If both teams play to their standard — the Sixers’ standard of course still being their negative net rating of -0.3, good for 18th in the league — we can’t compete.

However, even beyond their general skill, the Celtics are a brutal matchup for a variety of reasons. These are the keys that will decide the series — let’s break them down one by one.

Offensive Rebounding

You thought the Knicks were a bad matchup because of offensive rebounds? The Celtics actually grab a higher percentage of their misses than the Knicks, ranking fifth in the NBA in ORB%. Not only that, but they also rank eighth in scoring efficiency on those putback chances. If the Sixers can’t defensive rebound — and there’s absolutely no reason to think they suddenly will — it’s going to be incredibly difficult to get stops defensively.

Transition Scoring

Not being able to rebound and end possessions also hurts the Sixers’ offense. Beyond steals, defensive rebounds are the best way to get out in the open floor, where Tyrese Maxey and VJ Edgecombe can make a difference. Like most teams, the Sixers have also been much more efficient when playing with pace, with a 126.0 offensive rating in transition (16th in the NBA) compared to just a 96.3 offensive rating in the halfcourt (23rd in the NBA). However, this is another area where the Celtics make for a brutal matchup, as Boston ranks third in the NBA in transition defense, both in efficiency allowed and in limiting transition opportunities overall. Without the ability to get easy buckets in the open floor, I find it difficult to see where consistent offense will come from.

Ball Security

The Sixers’ main defensive strength this year is their turnover creation, ranking eighth in the NBA at creating disruption, and it helps them get out and run. Unfortunately, the Celtics are once again a tough matchup here, ranking second in the league at limiting turnovers offensively. But this is not an area the Sixers can afford to let Boston control.

Given the edge the Celtics already have in the possession battle through offensive rebounding and the way turnovers can spark transition chances, the Sixers need to be able to exert their influence here. If the Celtics control the ball this whole series, we’ll be lucky to get a single game.

Three-Point Shooting (maybe some hope here!)

The Celtics are notorious for getting up a ton of threes — and they followed that strategy once again this year, ranking third in the league in three-point volume, taking nearly 44% of their attempts from beyond the arc (even this is fairly low for them, having taken over 50% of their shots from deep last season). The Sixers, as we all know, just absolutely adore giving up looks from beyond the arc, especially if they can find a way to make sure they’re wide-open ones.

However, within these overarching stats, there’s a bit of an interesting split. While the Celtics are first in the NBA by a mile with their non-corner three-point volume, they actually rank 29th in their volume from the corner itself. The Sixers’ strengths have a similar discrepancy, ranking 14th-lowest in their non-corner three-point volume, but 24th volume allowed from the corner — which makes sense, because that’s typically the shot you concede out of aggressive help and trapping. The Sixers are also fourth in their efficiency allowed on non-corner threes, meaning the matchup from beyond the arc might not be quite as lopsided as it might appear at first glance.

That doesn’t mean the Sixers should feel good about giving up threes — the Celtics shoot over 42% on corner attempts (fourth in the NBA), so please, stop overhelping for one damn series Nick — but it does introduce a path. If the Sixers can keep the ball out of the corner and live with the right shots, there’s at least a version of this series where Boston goes cold for a game or two and gives a glimmer of hope.

Now unfortunately, that’s about as optimistic as I can get in this series. These teams have shown all year how good they are, and I don’t expect a miraculous change now. So try not to get too upset when the Sixers give up three offensive rebounds in a possession (just typing this is making me annoyed, so I don’t know how realistic that is, but give it a shot). Simply enjoy the ride for what it is and find the fun in VJ’s first playoffs or watching Drummond take seven corner threes in a game when Mazulla refuses to acknowledge he’s on the floor. Because at some point, belief has to meet reality, and this series is where that happens.

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The Sixers continue the battle to escape the play-in, and they’ve been more or less healthy for the first time in a while (knock on wood). That leaves Nick Nurse with a deceptively simple question: Who should be the team’s fifth starter alongside Joel Embiid, Tyrese Maxey, Paul George, and VJ Edgecombe (henceforth the team’s “core four”)?

There are two main options, with both Dominick Barlow and Kelly Oubre Jr. seeing time throughout the year to close out the lineup. And while that might sound like a simple either-or decision on the surface, the reality is a bit messier once you dig into the details.

For starters, injuries have cost us the ability to see these lineups consistently. The most-used Sixers lineup — Barlow with the core four — has just 396 non-garbage time possessions, or roughly four games’ worth of data. The Oubre version is even thinner at 220 possessions, or just over two games. None of the other combinations even clear the 100-possession threshold typically needed for lineup evaluation. For reference, several teams are starting to have lineups with over 1000 possessions. It (almost) makes you feel a little bad for Nick Nurse.

Now that doesn’t mean we can’t evaluate them at all; we just need to be a bit more careful with how we approach the context around the numbers. And even in the minutes that we do have, none of these lineups has been world-beating.

The core four with Barlow sit at a mediocre +1.2 points per 100 possessions, and the core four with Oubre are similarly uninspiring at just +2.5 points per 100 possessions. Those are still better than the overall Sixers squad — who still suffer the ignoble title of having a negative net rating as a prospective playoff team — but are distinctly poor when compared to other five-man units across the NBA.

Unfortunately, while neither option has been particularly impressive, we have to choose one of them. We can’t just trot out the core four and call it a day. So how do we differentiate between the two? It all comes down to tradeoffs and what you’re willing to live with.

To this point in the year, Barlow in the starting lineup has been much stronger defensively than the Oubre lineup, giving up a 112.7 defensive rating in non-garbage time (60th percentile), but not quite as successful on offense, with just a 113.9 offensive rating (32nd percentile).

A lot of that lineup’s defensive success stems from better defensive rebounding — though “better” is just the 39th percentile; it’s still the Sixers, after all — and limiting fouls. They have also been much more effective at keeping teams off the 3-point line and forcing a high volume of midrange looks, perhaps due to Barlow’s switchability.

However, offensively, the Barlow lineup can struggle to make shots. Opponents clog the paint, helping off Barlow’s lack of perimeter shooting — 3 of 18 on threes since the all-star break, and zero since March 15th — which shrinks the space for everyone else. In a playoff setting, where defenses are more deliberate about exploiting weak links, that pressure point is only going to get louder.

On the flip side, Oubre in the starting lineup — which is what Nurse has gone to in the last two games — has been much more impactful offensively, posting a 122.3 offensive rating in their minutes, while struggling more defensively, posting a 119.7 defensive rating.

The key driver of the offensive success has been 3-point shooting, with the Oubre starting lineup hitting 40.8% of their threes. Their halfcourt execution overall also sees a big jump, ranking in the 86th percentile among all 5-man lineups. Stick four shooters around Joel and you’ll have success on offense, who knew!

They lose much of the offensive rebounding volume and putback efficiency that Barlow provides, but when they can space the floor effectively, it cures all offensive ailments. Oubre in particular has been excellent when playing off of the big guy, hitting over 48% of his triples when sharing the floor with Joel overall. There’s some obvious regression risk baked into that number, but there’s also enough shooting around him to soften the drop if it comes.

Defensively, the issues will sound familiar to every Sixers fan who’s watched a game this year: rebounding and transition.

Their defensive rebounding has predictably struggled with Oubre as our fifth, allowing opponents to get back over one in every three misses (12th percentile). However, not only are they giving up a high rate of offensive rebounds, but they are also getting absolutely shredded on second-chance opportunities, sitting in the 0th percentile (a.k.a. the worst five-man lineup in the league) and giving up a 214.3 offensive rating on putbacks. Now obviously, there are some small sample size caveats here where the opponent scoring rate is highly unlikely to stay that high. But without Barlow’s (still just mediocre) defensive rebounding at the 4, this lineup has no way to end possessions.

The same lackadaisical approach extends to transition play, where they are once again defending at the level of the worst five-man lineup in the league (not a phrase I should ever be typing twice in an article).

So where does that leave us? Right back at the tradeoff. Who you want to start comes down to what aspects of the team performance you want to prioritize — offense and shooting with Oubre, or defense and rebounding with Barlow?

My personal opinion is they should start with Barlow, both because our rebounding is so lackluster without him and because of his burgeoning partnership with Joel. But Nurse can rely on the hot hand in each matchup to decide how he wants to close the game.

Regardless of who they choose, the starting five Nurse ultimately plans to go with needs to get consistent minutes as much as possible over the next three games so they can enter the playoffs with some confidence. There’s no perfect answer here, but the Sixers need to decide which version of themselves they trust when it matters.

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Who is this team?

The Sixers put together two professional wins over the Bulls and Hornets, and the vibes are right back to an all-time high. We’re officially in the “tease” period, as Spike and Mike called it on the most recent pod. Joel Embiid and Paul George returning make the Sixers immediately look like an actual NBA basketball team — a notable shift from whatever farce we were throwing out for the few weeks before that.

They clearly have an impact on their own, but is there any additional change they’re causing on the players around them? And if so, who are they impacting the most? That’s where things start to get a bit more interesting than the obvious “they’re good players” takeaway.

Let’s start with the obvious point: the Sixers are simply better with them on the floor. This is fairly clear to anyone who has paid a modicum of attention to the Sixers at any point, but for those who doubt the true veracity of that statement, please see this article from earlier in the season. If you’re still doubtful, consider that the Sixers are +8.0 points per 100 possessions better with Joel on the floor and +9.4 better with PG on the floor (his defensive impact is real!). This extends to any combination of the two, with an excellent statistical profile together, and each holding a positive net rating when having to carry the team on their own. That may be more surprising for PG, but every single player he has played with on the Sixers has won their minutes by more with him than without him.

So yes, the baseline takeaway is simple: the Sixers are better when their stars play. The more interesting question is what happens beyond that. Who else are they helping?

Dominick Barlow, for one, sticks out as being far better playing with Joel and PG than not. He is the only player whose scoring doesn’t fall significantly with the 2nd- and 3rd-leading scorers on the team added to the mix, averaging right around 12 points per 75 possessions with or without them. But the way he gets those points is far more impactful, particularly with Joel, as Barlow’s efficiency spikes way up, with a 6.1 percentage point better TS% with Joel than without.

The reason for that is his rim pressure, taking over 71% of his shots at the rim with Joel on the floor compared to just 46% when he’s off — given Barlow’s much higher efficiency at the rim compared to on 3’s or midrange looks, it’s easy to see how his productivity takes a jump. It makes a ton of sense why this is the case, as Joel adds far more spacing with his midrange and 3-point willingness than Andre Drummond or Adem Bona, who clog up the paint more. Joel also seems to have a great feel for Barlow’s off-ball cutting when he gets doubled, which actually lets him leverage the space into points.

In addition, without anyone else taking up space at the rim, Barlow’s individual offensive rebounding rate nearly doubles, crashing the rim far more aggressively into the empty space. We spent the last month or so wondering why Barlow had hit a wall since getting his new contract, and it turns out he was probably just missing Joel.

He appears to have a positive impact on Joel’s minutes too with his interior activity (see the lineup graphic below), which also makes sense given Joel’s clear decrease in interior activity. Pairing them together more consistently could provide a boost to both of their minutes — and to be fair, Kate and Alaa did mention Nick Nurse liked this pairing on the broadcast yesterday, so he might be on it.

VJ Edgecombe is another excellent example of a player who gets better with our stars back. Without having to carry the offense for stretches, he can utilize his athleticism and impressive game feel to attack off the advantages Joel and (to a lesser extent) PG create with their gravity.

It shows up in his efficiency, with an 8.8 percentage point increase in TS% with Joel and a 6.7 percentage point increase with PG. Most of that once again comes from leveraging the space Joel and PG provide, as VJ gets to the rim more frequently with either of them on the court, and he is also finishing those chances much better with Joel on the floor — 67.1% rim finishing with Joel compared to 53.2% without.

The looks he gets are simpler as well, as VJ cuts his off-the-dribble midrange volume nearly in half and sees a notable increase in the percentage of his baskets that are assisted. His volume falls off somewhat in the process, which is fairly expected given the heliocentrism of our stars, but it’s gotten to a point where it feels like every shot he takes as an auxiliary piece is going in at this point. As impressively far ahead of schedule as VJ has been in his rookie year, this off-ball role is a much cleaner fit with his current skillset, allowing him to attack advantages and leverage spacing instead of having to create his own looks in a more bogged-down offense.

And in a lot of ways, that’s the common thread here. Joel and PG don’t just raise the team’s ceiling — they simplify the game for everyone else on the floor.

When you’re watching the basketball slop that the Sixers have provided us for the last month, it’s easy to simply accept that as just who the team is, and forget how critical Joel and PG are to the team’s success. Not just through their own individual impact, but also through their impact on the players around them.

Their spacing in particular opens up a massive amount of offense that simply isn’t available with our more 3-point-averse players on the floor (really makes you wonder how much Mike’s lifelong dream of a floor-spacing big could help). Barlow and VJ are the clearest examples of that impact, but throw on any Sixers game and you’ll see the shift in the way Joel and PG warp the court for others.

I won’t make any declarative proclamations about the playoffs or anything else, but if they’ve somehow fully made it past the most recent injury bug (or PED bug in PG’s case) — a statement I am already regretting typing out — this version of the Sixers has a chance to be at least competitive and entertaining. And that’s an outcome I am more than happy to live with.

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Time for the best time of the year… March Madness. Endless games, crazy upsets, what’s not to like? As a Sixers fan, I came into this year prepared to have no stake in the game, given our top-four-protected pick that was traded to the Thunder a million years ago, but all of a sudden, we have a handy-dandy first-rounder from the Rockets courtesy of the Jared McCain trade. We could get anyone with this draft pick to add to our young core! Who knows, maybe we’ll even get someone like Jared McCain?

As we get closer to the true draft season, I’ll start to put out a bit more information on the draft class as a whole. But given the wonderful time of the year we are in, it makes sense to provide some teams to watch that the Sixers’ front office might be watching as well.

I’m generally focusing on teams with high-profile wings and bigs, given the clear lack of availability we have for any guard spots — no, I’m not bitter about the Jared McCain trade at all, I swear. However, if you have the itch and want to watch some entertaining guards that will be available around our likely early-20s range, some fun additional options to the list below are: Tyler Tanner (Vanderbilt), Chris Anderson (Texas Tech), and Bennett Stirtz (Iowa). Now let’s dive into the rest (sorted by team for ease of scouting).

Michigan (1 seed):

First Game: Thurs, Mar 19th at 7:10 PM EST vs Howard (16 seed)

Players to Scout: Yaxel Lendeborg (14.6 PPG, 7.0 RPG, 3.2 APG), Morez Johnson (13.1 PPG, 7.2 RPG, 1.1 BPG), & Aday Mara (11.6 PPG, 6.9 RPG, 2.6 BPG)

If you’re looking for a big, Michigan is the clear-cut best place to start. They have been one of the top-three teams in the country all year, and do so by dominating the paint on both sides of the ball, playing a gargantuan starting lineup that includes Yaxel Lendeborg (6’9”, 7’4” wingspan), Morez Johnson (6’9”, 7’2” wingspan), and Aday Mara (7’3”, 7’7” wingspan).

Lendeborg is the most versatile of the three, earning first-team All-American honors with capable three-point scoring and strong playmaking in addition to his interior dominance. His only real weakness is his age, as he will be 24 by the start of the 2026-27 season. He’s unlikely to last all the way to the Sixers given his versatility and impact, but he would be a strong candidate if he did slide.

Johnson and Mara are more traditional bigs who would fall into a backup big role behind Joel and/or potentially develop into the starter next to Tyrese Maxey and VJ Edgecombe in a post-Joel future. Johnson fits into more of an Isaiah Stewart mold as an ultra-athletic wrecking ball defensively. He has some promising shooting indicators, even if he has not taken many threes this year, but most of his offense for Michigan comes off of assists at the rim (which would help Mike’s lob data numbers if we had a guard who could throw them).

Mara is a bit more versatile — and is an early favorite on my personal big board – with effective post-up moves and incredible playmaking for his size. He’s also the core defensive anchor for the Wolverines as one of the best block threats in the country. Mara has struggled with any kind of shooting touch and is good for the occasional Grimes-esque hair-on-fire giveaway, but the flashes could project to a high-level starter.

Arizona (1-seed):

First Game: Fri, Mar 20th at 1:35 PM EST vs LIU (16 seed)

Players to Scout: Brayden Burries (15.9 PPG, 4.7 RPG, 2.5 APG), Koa Peat (13.6 PPG, 5.3 RPG, 2.7 APG), & Motiejus Krivas (10.5 PPG, 8.1 RPG, 1.8 BPG)

The Wildcats join Michigan in the rarified air of having multiple potential Sixers prospects on the roster. First is scoring wing Brayden Burries (6’4”). He is one of the few guard-size prospects I have listed in the main section here, because of his size and capability to defend up, similar to Edgecombe. Burries is an incredibly balanced prospect who scores at all three levels, is a willing playmaker, and would join Edgecombe and Maxey to threaten in transition even further. The odds of him falling to the mid-20s aren’t great, but he would be a great value if he reaches the Sixers.

If you want to look a little bigger, Zona has two dominant bigs in Koa Peat and Motiejus Krivas. For full transparency, I’m not super high on Peat (6’8”, 6’11” wingspan), who is sized like a wing at the NBA level, but profiles more like a center with his play style, relying on interior scoring and offensive rebounding. However, plenty of people more experienced than me have him ranked around the Sixers’ range, highlighting his motor, strength, and effective playmaking from the big spot.

I’m more of a fan of Krivas (7’2”, 7’5” wingspan), who profiles as one of the best rim protectors in this class and dominates as a rebounder on both sides of the ball. He’s not the playmaker or self-creator that Mara from Michigan is, but his FT generation and strong shooting indicators (77% FT% in his career) could provide more future floor-spacing opportunities if he’s able to develop.

Alabama (4 seed):

First Game: Fri, Mar 20th at 3:15 PM EST vs Hofstra (13 seed)

Players to Scout: Amari Allen (11.7 PPG, 7.1 RPG, 37% 3P%) & Labaron Philon (21.7 PPG, 4.7 APG, 40% 3P%)

The Crimson Tide play host to one of my favorite potential Sixers prospects in Amari Allen (6’8”), a traitsy freshman wing. Allen is extremely versatile with excellent playmaking for his size, and can score from beyond the arc, attacking off closeouts, or getting to the FT line. Add on his capable defensive playmaking and switchability, and you have a prospect profile that lacks any major holes. He is the exact kind of prospect that rises on draft boards late, similar to a Cedric Coward last year — but if he’s available, I’d be very happy with this pick.

A less likely draft option is Labaron Philon, a high-usage combo guard who returned to Alabama this season even after getting first-round draft buzz last year. The issue? He stands at 6’4” and only weighs 185 lbs. That being said, Philon would still tempt me with his blazing-quick first step, elite playmaking, and ability to score efficiently at all three levels, often on high-difficulty attempts. He would be an incredible value at our draft slot if he falls this far, similar to the Maxey pick in 2020, though I’m doubtful the front office would look to pair Philon with our already small backcourt (and I can’t entirely blame them). Regardless, he’ll be a fun player to watch this March as he tears through the lane in Alabama’s fast-tempo offense.

Texas (11 seed):

First Game: Thurs, Mar 19th at 7:25 PM EST vs BYU (6 seed)

Players to Scout: Dailyn Swain (17.7 PPG, 7.6 RPG, 3.4 APG)

One of the most common names being thrown around for the Sixers resides with the Texas Longhorns: third-year wing Dailyn Swain (6’7”). Swain is one of the more unique prospects in this year’s draft, playing with a Giannis-esque style that lets him get to the rim and FT line at will while creating for his teammates as a dangerous playmaker. For those looking to take a risk, the ceiling outcome for Swain next to Maxey and Edgecombe is incredibly enticing with his size and skill. However, he has a key weakness in his three-point shooting, which is the reason he may be available to the Sixers in the first place. He has shown effective touch (82% FT% in his career on high volume) and is knocking down 35% of his three-point looks this season, but the development of that swing skill will determine Swain’s ultimate role at the next level.

Texas’ first-round matchup adds extra intrigue as Swain will likely be matched up against AJ Dybantsa, a consensus top-three prospect at the wing position and the leading scorer in college basketball. If both players can get going, that matchup will be must-see TV.

Iowa State (2 seed):

First Game: Fri, Mar 20th at 2:50 PM EST vs TN State (15 seed)

Players to Scout: Joshua Jefferson (16.9 PPG, 7.9 RPG, 4.9 APG)

In a similar mold to Swain is first-team All-American Joshua Jefferson (6’8”). Jefferson is a slightly older prospect as a senior (22 years old), but he is one of the best playmakers in the country for his size and can operate as a playmaking hub in the middle of the floor — I can already picture the DHOs with Maxey and backdoor lobs to Edgecombe. Pair that with a strong frame and excellent defensive metrics, and it’s easy to see a two-way impact at the next level. Once again, though, we return to the shooting, with inconsistent touch from beyond the arc and at the FT line for his career. His volume and efficiency are both up this year, but it’s hard to imagine Jefferson as a major three-point threat at the next level.

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The tanking narrative has taken the NBA by storm. How dare these teams intentionally lose games in an effort to get a higher draft pick! And some of this outrage is valid: I’m not a fan of what some teams like the Jazz are doing, sitting their best players in the fourth quarter when a game is close. That’s unethical tanking — taking a team good enough to win and intentionally holding it back. We may need to bring back Sam Hinkie to show them how good, old-fashioned, respectable tanking is really done. Those Sixers teams were genuinely horrendous, no matter how hard they tried.

However it’s done, tanking is an inevitable part of the NBA. And the reason why is fairly simple.

This is a league where getting a generational player on your team is the key to winning at the highest level. And unless you’re the Lakers — who apparently wake up every morning to a trade offer sending them Luka Doncic for a bag of potato chips — the best way to get these players is the draft. And the best way to maximize the odds of drafting a star capable of carrying your team is by picking early. Pair that with the fact that the current CBA effectively allows teams to control a drafted player for the first 10 years of their career, and it’s easy to see the value of an early selection. These are all generalizations, and there are exceptions to the rule, of course, but on the whole, the draft is the best option in the current NBA landscape for building a team from the ground up.

Take that clear value of early draft picks and combine it with the fact that a worse record gives you a better chance at a higher draft pick, and voilà, the magic of tanking is revealed. And to be clear, this is how it should work! You want to have a balanced league where teams that are bad have a chance to cycle back around and be competitive again. The Pistons and Spurs are good examples of horrible teams flipping around after hitting on a star to lead the team, in Cade Cunningham and Victor Wembanyama, respectively.

So what’s the problem here? Why are the NBA and the media that cover the league so upset?

It’s that there are too many teams doing it (and potentially that it’s messing with their gambling partnerships, but that’s naturally not an endorsed reason from the league). You can make a real argument that nine teams are actively trying to lose games in the NBA. They’re easy to find — just look at the bottom of the standings. Add in the Pelicans, who have no incentive to lose, but are just bad (except on Fly the Process games), and a full third of the league is effectively a bye game for the other two-thirds of the league. That makes for a bad product.

So the NBA has come out with some grandstanding, mentioning how they are going to make “substantial changes” after this year to solve the problem. The NBA has never tried to fix this before, so at least finally they… oh wait no, they have tried. About five different times, in fact. And wouldn’t you know it, those changes — most notably the flattened lottery odds — are the exact reason we’re in this predicament in the first place (more on that in a minute).

Unfortunately, the NBA has not learned from this fact and has come up with several potential solutions to fix this tanking problem once and for all. To be fair, most of these ideas come from a reasonable place. The league wants to discourage teams from intentionally losing games. The problem is that many of these proposals underestimate how quickly teams adapt to whatever incentive structure the rules create. I’ve always loved game theory, so let’s put on our economist hats and walk through why each is likely to do nothing at best or backfire horribly at worst.

Flatten odds for all lottery teams: Let’s start with the worst of them all. The whole reason we’re in this tanking fiasco in the first place is that the NBA already flattened the odds once, which gave teams farther down the standings the hope of jumping into the top four and landing a generational talent. And the thing is, they’re right to believe it (see Dallas and San Antonio last year). By spreading those odds across more teams, the league didn’t eliminate tanking; it just made tanking appealing to a larger portion of the standings. If anything, the odds should tilt more heavily toward the worst teams so they can actually find their way out of purgatory. Flatten them further, and you won’t reduce tanking — you’ll just encourage more teams to join in and potentially even lose their way out of a playoff/play-in position like the 2022-23 Mavericks.

First-round draft picks can be protected only for top-four or top-14-plus selections: One of their better ideas. I can see where they’re coming from: Removing protections entirely means we won’t have scenarios like the Jazz trying to keep a top-8 protected pick away from the Thunder this year (though the Jazz would probably be tanking regardless, to be frank). But limiting protections to top-4 or top-14 just creates a new arbitrary cutoff for teams to tank toward.

Lottery odds freeze at the trade deadline or a later date: Sure, teams won’t intentionally tank after the decided date, but the incentives for bad teams getting high picks don’t change, so this just means teams will tank earlier in the year.

No longer allowing a team to pick in the top four in consecutive years and/or after consecutive bottom-three finishes: *Taps the sign* The whole point of the draft is to get bad teams back to relevance! Stop trying to make it harder! Even if we remove that factor, this incentivizes other teams farther down the order to tank harder because they are competing against a smaller pool of teams.

Lottery odds allocated based on two-year records: The only thing better than teams tanking for one year… is teams tanking for multiple years.

Lottery extended to include all play-in teams: My finger is starting to hurt from all this sign-tapping. Why would a team that’s actively in the playoffs need a star player more than the worst team in the league?

Teams can’t pick in the top four the year after making the conference finals: Genuinely just why??? Any team that was just in the conference finals is not being intentionally bad; they just got hit with horrible luck (i.e., this year’s Pacers with Haliburton’s torn achilles).

Moral of the story? You can’t make changes that remove the team record from the draft slot equation, or you lose out on the entire purpose of the draft itself: to improve bad teams. This year features an elite draft class, so naturally, there’s going to be tanking. More than likely, the NBA will make a change this offseason, teams will tank less because of a worse 2027 Draft, and the league representatives will scream from the rooftops that they fixed the problem until the next wave comes back around.

The NBA needs to stop trying to remove tanking from the game entirely and instead try to limit its volume. If there were just three or four tanking teams, it wouldn’t be getting even close to the volume of backlash there is currently. Stop expanding the lottery just to give more teams a shot at the players meant to turn bad teams into contenders.

There are various ideas that could be more impactful for changing the incentives or applications of those incentives. My personal favorite: remove the lottery entirely for the top two picks and actually give those to the two worst records and then make it so you can’t receive a top-two pick in back-to-back years. Some other ideas I personally like better than those currently proposed are un-flattening the lottery odds, shifting the lottery higher (i.e., only the top-10 picks), or rewarding teams/players for wins with monetary incentives. Regardless of the exact solution, you have to induce a change in the incentives causing the middling teams to tank, not those at the bottom.

Tanking isn’t some mysterious flaw in the NBA ecosystem. It’s the natural result of a league where the worst teams get the best chance at the best players. You can flatten the lottery odds, freeze them at the trade deadline, or invent a dozen other tweaks, but incentives will always win. As long as the draft is the fastest path to a superstar, some teams will decide losing today is the best way to win tomorrow.

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Man, the Sixers don’t make it easy on you. All the good vibes you could have in a season, and as a reward, we Sixers fans are blessed with a Paul George suspension, a Jared McCain trade, and a part 638 to the Joel Embiid injury saga — and that’s even before the absolute embarrassment they provided for the loyal Fly the Process fandom. (Of course, they did respond by trouncing a quality Timberwolves team and blowing out the Pacers, but I view that as more of a sadistic fandom methodology, trying to pull us back in with an unpredictable win every once in a while so they can hit us with another version of the Pelicans game as soon as possible.)

There’s a peddling of hope every year — “Just wait until Joel comes back, and we start to find our rhythm for the second half of the season” — and we can sometimes talk ourselves into embracing that hope, believing that, just maybe, this team can get it done… “It,” of course, being finally breaking through the glass ceiling and appearing in the conference finals, and maybe if the NBA gods were so kind, beating a good team on the way there.

But is there any evidence backing that statement this year? Not really.

We’re in unprecedented territory this year for overall performance for the Sixers. Outside of last season’s disaster, the Sixers have typically been at least in the top third of the league by net rating and have a reasonable argument to being better than their record suggests. This year, the Sixers are 14th in net rating, smack dab in the middle of the NBA (+0.7 net rating) — and it’s not even just one side of the ball that needs to be shored up; they are middle of the pack on both offense (13th) and defense (15th). Since 2017, with Joel at least marginally more available in previous years, the Sixers have only been below 10th once (11th in 2018-19) and never had a net rating below +2.6.

You all see me use net rating a lot in these articles as a measure of team strength, so let’s use this time to back up that characterization and explore the Sixers’ role within it. Since 2000, championship-winning teams have averaged a +7.2 net rating and a 3rd place ranking among all teams in net rating. There are outliers, such as 2010-11 Dallas Mavericks or 2000-01 Los Angeles Lakers, both of whom ranked 8th (yes, the team that beat the Sixers in the Finals had one of the lowest net ratings in the last 25 years… but of course), but the Sixers aren’t even hitting those levels of performance.

Now, the Sixers have had chances in previous years: ranking 4th in 2017-18 (+4.6 net rating) for the original Celtics loss in our first real year of Joel and Ben, 5th in 2020-21 (+5.5) when we lost to the Hawks (in my mind, an even worse series loss than the Raptors in 2018-19 — at least the Raptors were really good), and 3rd in 2022-23 (+4.4) when we lost to the Celtics in seven (also a brutal loss, but the Celtics were the top team in the NBA all year to be fair). This year, on the other hand, doesn’t seem to be one of those chances.

However, winning the championship is likely a pipe dream, as we are all aware, and not something we should be talking about after losing to the Pelicans by 15, so let’s shift this to a standard of success we are all much more familiar with: making the conference finals! Surely there’s some hope in just meeting that bare minimum benchmark? Nope.

Since 2000 (which is 25 years and 100 teams), there have only been two exceptions to having +2.0 net rating or better in the conference finals. The first is the 2022-23 Miami Heat (-0.5 net rating), aka. Jimmy Butler’s Linsanity run out of the play-in tournament. The second is the 2017-18 Cleveland Cavaliers (1.0 net rating), aka. Peak LeBron James with one of the craziest carry jobs we’ve seen ever in any playoff run.

We don’t have peak Jimmy Butler. We don’t have peak LeBron. To even hit the outlier outcome of success — 2% of all teams since 2000 from the numbers above — we need the corpse of Embiid to go on an unprecedented tear that will then live on in the annals of NBA history. That’s not a plan, that’s a prayer. The hope cycle only works if the numbers leave room for delusion. This year, they don’t. It’s not happening guys.

If we get to the playoffs at all at this point, we are going to have to play one of Detroit, Boston, New York, or Cleveland (more than likely two if we want to make the conference finals). All would categorize as beating a good team if we were to get a win, but at this point in the season, I’m having a hard time seeing the evidence that we’d truly be able to do so. I will root for it regardless, and when the time comes, I will almost definitely try to talk myself (and potentially you all as readers of this column) into thinking we have a chance.

But floating in the back of my head the whole time will just be the conclusion that this isn’t a contender waiting to wake up. It’s a middle-of-the-pack team hoping for a miracle. And hoping for miracles isn’t a strategy.

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“Ah, a nice, relaxing Sixers game…” I’ll take things that have never been said for $200, Ken.

The Sixers this year have been consistently forced to battle down to the wire, with the quantity and quality of those adventures already evaluated in this column. But one of the biggest reasons they keep finding themselves in cardiac situations is simpler: they are either lighting a perfectly good first-half lead on fire or digging themselves into a hole with disastrous third-quarter play.

The Sixers’ third quarters aren’t just bad. They’re fragile, and they reveal how little margin for error the Sixers have as a team. When the offense stutters for even a few minutes, the entire ecosystem collapses.

The numbers are genuinely stunning. The Sixers have a –18.0 net rating in the third quarter this year. Since the NBA began tracking quarter-level net ratings in 1996, this is the second-worst third-quarter mark ever recorded. The only team worse? The 1997-98 Denver Nuggets, who went 11-71. The rest of the company in that neighborhood isn’t exactly playoff-adjacent either.

And the gap is (almost) as alarming as the ranking. The difference between the Sixers in the third quarter at 30th and the Pacers at 29th (–8.8 net rating) is the same as the difference between the Pacers and the 15th-ranked Blazers. They aren’t just last. They’re in their own universe of bad third-quarter basketball, more than twice as bad as the nearest team.

Monday night against Portland makes for perhaps the cleanest example. They walked into the locker room up 65-64. They walked out and promptly lost the third quarter 49–22, effectively ending the game. (Luckily, the Knicks game didn’t even require a third-quarter collapse: The Sixers were kind enough to handle that by halftime.)

When numbers are this drastic, there’s no one-size-fits-all explanation. This is a catastrophic failure at multiple levels. But one issue stands above the rest: the offense.

In the third quarter, the Sixers are scoring 105.2 points per 100 possessions. That is not only the worst third-quarter offense in the league; it is the worst offensive mark any team has averaged in any single quarter this season.

Most of it comes down to shooting. The Sixers have both the lowest three-point percentage and the lowest two-point percentage of any team in the third quarter. Their effective field goal percentage drops by almost four percentage points compared to the rest of the game — a swing that, if flipped the other way, would put them near the top of the league in efficiency (we can only dream).

If you can’t make shots, it’s going to be hard to score. Riveting analytical analysis, I know.

The confusing part is that there’s no obvious structural shift. They’re taking similar shots. The rotation is nearly identical to the first quarter, where they rank 14th in net rating and look perfectly functional. It’s not fatigue, unless the team has collectively agreed to treat the third quarter as an optional cooldown before ramping back up in the fourth, where they rank sixth in net rating and suddenly remember how to operate again. They are fully capable of playing competent basketball both before and after this nightmarish twelve-minute window.

Other weaknesses don’t spike dramatically. They’re a little worse at offensive rebounding. A little worse at defensive rebounding. A little sloppier with the ball. Free throws dip slightly. All of that matters, but not nearly enough to explain a historically broken offense. The shooting crater is doing the heavy lifting.

So what could it be?

It could be effort — something that would surprise absolutely no one after the last couple of games — where they simply don’t re-enter with the same urgency. It could be halftime adjustments, with opponents taking away their first options and forcing them into Plan C faster than they’re comfortable. It could be rhythm, with starters sitting for 15 real-time minutes, cooling off, and never quite regaining flow. It could even be psychological, with one or two empty trips leading to visible tightness, rushed shots, and possessions that feel heavier than they should in February.

Whatever the exact cocktail of reasons, we now have the equivalent of 18 full games’ worth of third-quarter data. This isn’t a two-week blip. There is clearly something about this stretch of 12 minutes that tanks their efficiency.

Now that’s not to say the defense has helped. The Sixers rank second-to-last in defensive rating in the third quarter as well. They’re fouling much more often here, and, similar to the offense, there is a notable gap in opponents’ shooting in the third quarter to all other times. But the defense is just normal bad, while the offense is structurally broken.

And importantly, bad offense feeds bad defense. Missed shots turn into run-outs. Live-ball turnovers turn into cross-matches. When you’re constantly taking the ball out of your own net or scrambling after transition leaks, it becomes exponentially harder to string together stops. Then you’re attacking against a set defense on the other end, which makes clean looks even harder to generate, and the cycle continues. That’s how a few quick swings turn into a 20-point avalanche.

This is what fragility looks like. Not just missing shots, but missing shots that cascade.

In a strange way, the most impressive part of all this is that the Sixers are still competitive on the whole. To be a functional team while essentially spotting opponents an entire fourth of the game most nights is almost an accomplishment in itself.

But there’s a ceiling to that level of resilience. You can survive rebounding weaknesses. You can survive bench inconsistency. You cannot survive giving away 12 minutes every night. And until the Sixers prove they can stabilize those 12 minutes, every “nice, relaxing Sixers game” will remain firmly in the realm of fiction.

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It feels like they should be better than this.

Almost everything this season for the Sixers has actually been… pretty good? Joel Embiid is playing consistently again and hitting an offensive stride many (myself included) thought we’d never see again. Tyrese Maxey somehow took another leap. VJ Edgecombe is the prince who was promised, both on the court and in the vibes department. Daryl Supreme nailed both two-way signings to fill out the frontcourt depth with Dominick Barlow and Jabari Walker.

Of course, this also made something like the Paul George suspension feel inevitable. As AU so effectively portrayed, you can’t only have good vibes in Sixers land after all. But even accounting for that, the sum of all these wonderful parts ends up feeling like a pretty unsatisfying whole. The Sixers are still a middling team, hovering right on the edge of the play-in. Capable of stringing together wins, sure, but seemingly always fighting uphill to do it.

So why does a team getting so many things right still feel like it’s living possession to possession? There’s no clean, all-encompassing answer, but every explanation eventually touches on the same problem: The Sixers aren’t closing out stops on the defensive glass.

The numbers are blunt. The Sixers rank second-to-last in the NBA in DREB% — how often they actually secure an opponent’s missed shot. When they don’t, it hurts: Those possessions are bleeding 1.16 points per second chance, the ninth-worst mark in the league, and equivalent to handing opponents a 116 offensive rating after every offensive rebound.

NBA tracking data (which has gotten absurdly granular by the way) might provide some background to how this happens, as the Sixers also record the fewest box-outs per game on defensive rebounds. In other words, the team is often watching the ball float through the air and assuming it will fall into their lap. Oh, the other team shot? Well, it must be our turn next! I’ll just stand here and wait.

Now, you don’t need to be a team of Mr. Fundamentals on the glass to rebound well. The Houston Rockets — sixth in the NBA in DREB% and a team that feels synonymous with physicality — actually rank second-to-last in box-outs themselves. The difference isn’t just in technique. It’s also activity.

You can see it immediately on film. In one clip, Sixers players watch the ball descend while Nique Clifford casually grabs it in the middle of three defenders. In another, Houston’s entire lineup is moving toward the ball as Alperen Sengun works to make sure Isaiah Jackson never even gets a look at the rebound. Same sport, wildly different urgency.

Obviously, personnel plays a role here too.

It starts with the guards. Guard rebounding hasn’t been up to standard, and part of that is by design. The fast-paced, transition-heavy style that unlocks Maxey and Edgecombe’s open-floor magic also leaves fewer bodies committed to finishing possessions. The data reflects that tradeoff: VJ Edgecombe and Kelly Oubre Jr. carry the two most negative on/off differentials in offensive rebounding rate allowed, with Maxey not far behind in fourth. Bona sits third (more on him shortly), and there’s a noticeable drop-off after those four.

That overlap isn’t random. Maxey, VJ, and Kelly are three of the team’s most aggressive transition pushers. When all three share the floor together — over 500 minutes so far — the Sixers allow opponents to recover a staggering 37% of their missed shots, nearly seven percentage points worse than when that trio isn’t on the court.

When guards are tasked with offense-first responsibilities, someone has to pay the rebounding tax.

Then there’s the big rotation. Andre Drummond could theoretically be a knight in shining armor — or a 76er in a Blue Coat, I guess — but his role has nearly vanished. With the team prioritizing Bona’s development, Drummond has received 11 DNPs in the last 16 games where both Joel and Bona were available, and has logged under four total minutes across the last nine.

For all of Mike’s (fair!) frustration with Drummond’s lack of contested rebounds last year, the results are undeniable. He leads the team in fgDR%, securing 26% of all available defensive rebounds while on the floor, good for the 96th percentile among bigs and sixth best in the entire league. Compare that to Bona’s rough 12% (11th percentile) — it’s much harder to defensive rebound effectively when you’re chasing blocks as often as Bona is — and it’s easy to see how a modest shift in minutes could change the math.

Embiid, often the target of fans’ ire on the defensive glass, has actually been just fine here this year, with a solid but unspectacular 16% fgDR% (42nd percentile among bigs), and the team rebounds at the exact same level with him on and off the floor. However, that’s not to say he is blameless in this rebounding epidemic, as this middling defensive rebounding rate is the worst of his career by far. Embiid had previously excelled here, ranking above the 88th percentile on the defensive glass for seven straight seasons, before starting to fall off last year with his injuries.

Dominick Barlow has been another part of the equation. His effort on the offensive glass is undeniable — he grabbed TEN offensive boards last night against the Clippers — but that hasn’t translated defensively. He’s ending possessions at just over an 11% fgDR%, placing him in the 8th percentile among bigs.

None of this means the Sixers need to become an elite rebounding team overnight. They don’t need to turn into the 2004 Pistons. They just need this to stop being such a liability.

That’s where the trade deadline inevitably enters the conversation. If there’s a move to be made, getting help on the glass — especially from the wing, with Paul George newly sidelined — could quietly raise the team’s floor. Someone like Pat Connaughton, who has fallen out of the rotation in Charlotte but has been an excellent defensive rebounding wing for most of his career and can space the floor offensively, could help without breaking anything else. Naji Marshall fits a similar mold, though he likely costs too much. Cheaper options like Dalen Terry or Devin Carter offer rebounding plus playmaking utility. All of this does feel fairly unlikely from a contract standpoint given the looming tax duck — and knowing the Sixers, we’d likely spring another leak depending on which rotation piece we trade away in the process — but a man can dream.

Still, the path is clear. The Sixers are already doing enough good things to matter, and they have shown themselves capable of the effort needed on the glass through their surprising offensive rebounding success. Turn it around, and maybe the good vibes of this season can turn into consistent success, or who knows, maybe even beating a good team in the playoffs.

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Jared McCain’s recent assignment to the Delaware Blue Coats (a much better name than the 87ers for the record) feels like a moment of reckoning — especially for those, like Spike, who see McCain as a core piece of this team going forward. On the surface, it reads like a demotion. However, I’d prefer to view it as a useful checkpoint for understanding what has actually changed in his game.

The timing is helpful, as McCain has played 522 minutes so far this season — almost identical to the 504-minute takeover stretch he had last year from November 8 through December 4, and not far off his total workload as a rookie (594 minutes). That symmetry gives us a clean comparison point. At this point, it’s clearly not just an extended cold streak. It feels like something is fundamentally off, and the data provides a fair way to test that instinct.

Let’s start with what jumps off the page: the shooting has been bad.

His eFG% (weighted 2’s and 3’s) has gone from 56% last year — good for 79th percentile among combo guards — to just 44%, which is a brutal 2nd percentile. In particular, his 2-pt efficiency has been abysmal, making under 38% inside the arc. For reference, he shot better than that from three last season! While volatility is normal for young guards, this magnitude of difference has been alarming. Whether the cause of this is rhythm, lingering effects from injury, Nick Nurse rotations, or a combination of factors is hard to pin down, but the efficiency has seen a major hit.

He’s also not getting to the line. McCain is being fouled on his shots roughly half as often as he was last year, which compounds the efficiency drop and removes one of the easier ways for a scorer to stabilize production when the jumper isn’t falling.

To be clear, the signal isn’t all negative. The Sixers have been +2.9 points per 100 possessions better with McCain on the floor this season. That’s real value. There are plenty of possible reasons for that signal: the threat of his three alone could provide spacing, his willingness to keep the offense flowing could get better looks for teammates, or it could even be just a misleading small sample size. But when you compare it to last year’s +4.6 mark, it becomes easier to understand why concern has crept in. Even if he is still helping, he’s not bending games the way he briefly did before.

However, those are all fairly obvious points you can pick up just by watching with your own eyes. So what’s changed beneath the surface? The biggest difference is usage.

McCain’s breakout stretch last season coincided perfectly with Tyrese Maxey missing six games and Joel Embiid appearing in only four of those 13 contests. With the offense suddenly stripped down, McCain’s role expanded overnight. His usage spiked early and never really came back down, even after Maxey returned. During that stretch, he posted a 26% usage rate (77th percentile), while this season, that number sits at just 17 % (18th percentile). A shift in game responsibility of that magnitude is sure to have an impact on a player’s approach.

That context matters, but it doesn’t tell the full story. The real separator is how McCain performs with Maxey on versus off the floor.

Jared McCain’s performance in key areas with and without Tyrese Maxey in the 2024-25 season (left) and the 2025-26 season (right).

When you compare his per-75-possession numbers across seasons, one thing becomes clear quickly: McCain alongside Maxey looks largely the same as it did last year. His on-ball usage is similar. His playmaking is similar. His free-throw rate hasn’t meaningfully changed. He’s taking a few more midrange shots — something that stands out on film — but not enough to fundamentally reshape his profile. The efficiency drop is significant, with his true shooting percentage down nearly 10 points, but that decline shows up everywhere and lines up with the “obvious stuff” we already covered.

The real shift happens when Maxey sits.

Last season, those minutes belonged to McCain. The usage, scoring, playmaking, and free throw volume all exploded, and somehow, his efficiency followed. Those 343 minutes were the high-end Jared McCain experience — the version that pops in your head from a YouTube highlight reel set to the tune of “Enter Sandman” (no, there’s no reason I chose that song in particular, why do you ask?).

This year, that version hasn’t shown up in the same way. His playmaking still ticks up without Maxey, but nearly everything else takes a step back. He’s not commanding possessions, drawing fouls, or tilting the floor from beyond the arc like he did during that stretch. In these runs, McCain is asked to function as the primary organizer rather than a high-usage scorer, and without the same freedom to dominate possessions in the way that fueled last year’s run, he’s been unable to find his balance.

There are plenty of reasons this could be happening. Embiid and Paul George are available more often, and VJ Edgecombe has emerged out of thin air as someone who needs touches. McCain missed training camp and is still working back from injury. Or he’s a small guard, and the league has figured out how best to capitalize. All of these could be clear and logical explanations for a dip in production, though they also highlight how different his role (and margin for error) has become on a healthier, deeper Sixers squad.

So what does it all mean? I’m not here to take a principled stand on whether Jared McCain is a future star (though I do believe there is an impactful NBA player hidden away somewhere in his 6’3” frame). Belief in him ultimately comes down to how you interpret those 343 minutes from last season. Were they a glimpse of hidden upside, temporarily unlocked by circumstance but very real? Or were they a rookie-year Linsanity run that only works in short bursts on a stripped-down roster?

What is clear is that the combination of that hot stretch and the Sixers being surprisingly competitive this season has accelerated expectations. McCain hasn’t met them yet, but that doesn’t mean they were misguided in the first place. He’s played just over 1,000 minutes in his NBA career and just 54 games in non-garbage time; it’s still incredible early in his career to be making a concrete judgment about what he can or can’t be. So, this Blue Coats stint isn’t necessarily a verdict. It’s a pause — and maybe a needed reset for both us as fans and McCain as a player — before we find out which version of Jared McCain is closer to the truth. Only time will tell.

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Throughout this season, there has been trade chatter about getting off the Joel Embiid and Paul George contracts, most notably on the last pod where Spike and Mike discussed whether they would accept a Trae Young-like salary dump.

Well, we were just provided the ideal case study to evaluate what the team would look like without them. The Sixers played the Toronto Raptors on back-to-back nights, with the only big change between games coming from the addition of Joel and PG back into the lineup. The outcome? A 29-point halftime lead that ended in a comfortable win and a performance in direct contrast to what we saw the night before. These two games show exactly what the Sixers would lose if they moved on from Joel and PG.

To get out ahead of it, a lot of that difference is due to the Sixers shooting a gazillion percent from everywhere in game two (the Sixers’ 68.45% true shooting on Monday was the highest in a game this season) — it’s not hard to look better when the shots are falling.

But it’s not just that; these are impactful players when available. Joel is playing like prime Boogie Cousins and Paul George has settled in as an (admittedly overpaid) third or even fourth option, where his off-ball capabilities and IQ can excel. They are making a difference on the court, and the numbers bear that out.

Maxey on his own has been very impressive, carrying the team to a +2.5 net rating (point differential per 100 possessions) without either of Joel or PG on the floor — that’s not contender-level dominance, but it’s pretty good. We have been begging for even net-neutral minutes when Joel sits for years, and we have finally gotten it through Maxey’s evolution. Maxey has also had to do this while bearing an incredible load, with 731 minutes holding up the offense without his costars, equivalent to over 15 full NBA games.

Now an intuitive reader like yourself might look at those numbers and say: “Beckett, you’re clearly contradicting your title. This just shows Maxey is perfectly capable of carrying lineups on his own, so we don’t need to deal with Joel and PG at all anymore!”

However, even if you believe Maxey should be the clear first-option star — which I do in fact agree with — the additional elevation Joel and PG provide to Maxey’s minutes on and most notably off the floor provide unbelievable value.

Even with VJ Edgecombe’s unbelievable start to the year, take Maxey off the floor without replacing that production and the Sixers have collapsed. This is where the Raptors games become revealing. In Sunday’s loss, the Sixers won Maxey’s 45 minutes by 17 and lost the 8 minutes he sat by 18, a difference that would make even 2019-Raptors-series Greg Monroe proud. Even an overhead view of the full season sees them falling to a -12.7 net rating without any of the top three, solidly worse than the league-bottom Washington Wizards (who are REALLY bad by the way, on par with the Process Sixers).

However, add in Joel and PG to share the load and suddenly they can survive without Maxey just fine. In Monday’s win, the Sixers won Maxey’s 35 minutes by +13 and lost the 13 minutes he was off the floor by… zero!

The macro scale numbers once again back this up. Joel and PG shared minutes without Maxey have had an elite +16.2 net rating, though admittedly in a limited 62 minutes. Add in the more robust and meaningful sample (229 minutes) of Joel and PG sharing minutes with Maxey, and we see a strong +7.1 net rating, on par with the NBA’s third-best Boston Celtics (who have been annoyingly good).

This shows up not just in scoring, but in how the offense functions. Let’s take a more applied look at how through a film lens. Compare these two screen grabs of Maxey drives from Sunday’s loss (top) and Monday’s win (bottom):

The shell of the defense is unbelievably more spread out in the second frame with the biggest change simply being the addition of Paul George into the strong-side corner instead of Barlow. There is a clear difference in the spacing afforded to Maxey when Nurse is forced to rely on less-consistent shooters. He has to both shoot more and work harder for his shots, all while getting the full attention of the opposing defense. Add in Joel and PG, and all of a sudden there are other threats to account for, which helps open up their offense.

Joel in particular makes an impact here. The Sixers are dead-last in the NBA in assists per 100 possessions at 24.1, but add in Joel and that number goes up. The team improves to 25.7 assists per 100 possessions with Joel on the floor (which would be 17th in the NBA) and a rough 23.6 with him off. The ability to put the opposing team into rotation with his gravity helps get the ball moving effectively and lets Maxey shine more off-ball, where he is the most effective.

This also isn’t all about Maxey. VJ has been awesome, but he is not yet built to be the No. 2 on a contending-level team, and his usage skyrockets without Joel and PG on the floor. The most recent example is in these Raptors games. In Sunday’s loss he was inefficient, scoring 17 points on 6-19 shooting with a high 23.6% usage rate. In Monday’s win he was far better, scoring 15 points on 5-7 shooting with just a 12.7% usage rate.

A lot of this difference in efficiency is due to the types of shots he gets. Even if VJ’s pull-up scoring is ahead of schedule, these shots are still far more inefficient than when he gets set up (43.5% eFG off the dribble versus 59.8% eFG on catch and shoot). When he is pushed into a bigger role, he is forced into a ton of these shots, as 15 of his 19 attempts in Sunday’s loss were self-created, compared to just 3 of his 7 in Monday’s win. That role adjustment has ripple effects down the whole roster, shifting players into positions where they can excel.

All that to say, as much as it is scary to rely on players as aging and injury-prone as Joel and PG, they are needed if our goal is still to compete at the highest level. A trade for more available pieces likely gives a more stable floor at the cost of the ceiling, and a salary dump is out of the question. Long-term, the Maxey and VJ backcourt is the future, but for now we need to enjoy the old guys still having a legitimately positive impact. Because if the Sixers still want a championship-caliber ceiling, moving on from Joel and PG isn’t a necessary step forward — it’s a crippling step backward.

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Beckett Sanderson is a new columnist for the Ricky. You’ll hear more from him and learn more of what he’s about shortly, but for now everyone just say hi to Beckett and read his first of no doubt many columns about the Sixers taking years off our collective lives.

I don’t know how many more of these my heart can handle. Even with the Nuggets loss on Monday, the Sixers are off to a 19–15 start that has exceeded most of our preseason expectations. But if you feel like these wins (and a handful of losses) have been causing an abnormal amount of stress, even by Philly standards, you’d be right.

Of the team’s 34 games to start the season, 23 of them have come down to the clutch (defined by the NBA as the last 5 minutes of the 4th quarter/OT with the margin of ≤5), second only to the Mavericks. The Sixers have also had 10 games decided by three points or fewer and another five games that have gone to overtime — both the highest in the league. Someone needs to check on Mike’s FitBit.

Despite making for a highly distressing viewing experience, the Sixers have actually been effective in these clutch situations, posting a 13-10 record so far. They have a net rating (point differential per 100 possessions) of +13.7 in clutch minutes, seventh-best in the league, and a night-and-day difference compared to their overall net rating of +0.9. If they could only play like this before the last five minutes, they’d have a record on par with the Oklahoma City Thunder (+13.3).

So how are they doing it? The answer is not MVP candidate Tyrese Maxey, ex-MVP Joel Embiid, or the, uh, Eagles parade-inspired Paul George. It’s rookie VJ Edgecombe, just 30 games into his career.

Of course, even in a broader context, VJ has been a positive presence. The Sixers are +3.4 per 100 possessions with him on the floor this season, and they’ve notably held their own even in the VJ minutes when Maxey sits (+1.4) — uncommon stability for a rookie to provide without his co-star. However, it’s late in games where Edgecombe’s impact has exploded.

In high-leverage situations, the Sixers have posted a staggering +33.7 net rating across VJ’s 84 minutes on the floor. That number comes with the usual small-sample caveats, but it illustrates just how extreme his impact has been. For perspective, the 2015-16 Warriors finished their 73-9 season with a net rating of +10.7 overall.

This isn’t VJ simply benefiting from those around him; he’s actively driving their success. Among players with at least 15 clutch attempts, he ranks second in the entire NBA in effective field goal percentage (73.5%), trailing only Anthony Edwards. Built into that number is a ridiculous 58.8% shooting from three, a stunning proposition for a player who entered the league with questions about whether he could consistently shoot at all (though it’s unlikely he will continue to be this good). Add in his defensive impact—VJ leads the Sixers in both steals AND blocks in the clutch — and you have a player who could arguably be a candidate for clutch player of the year.

For a rookie to play heavy clutch minutes and thrive on both ends of the floor is rare in any context. For the Sixers, it’s been the difference between surviving many of these stress-inducing games and losing far more of them.

However, while watching VJ take over games late has been entertaining, this volume of close matchups isn’t harmless. With each fourth quarter turning into a high-leverage situation, Maxey and VJ’s minutes have continued to climb. Maxey is still far and away the league leader in minutes per game, and VJ is not far behind at 6th, playing the most minutes per game (35.8) for a rookie since Andrew Wiggins in 2014-15. When the score is tight in almost every game, Nurse has little choice but to ride his best players, but it adds unavoidable risk given the wear and tear of today’s NBA.

History suggests clutch success is fragile. Winning close games is valuable, but relying on them as a nightly survival strategy isn’t a sustainable formula for either long-term success or player health.

Monday night’s game against a skeleton Nuggets squad was a perfect example of the problem. That matchup should have been over by midway through the 3rd quarter to provide some old-fashioned load management. Instead, Maxey played 46 minutes, VJ played 42, and Joel hit a season-high 40 minutes against a team missing all five of its starters. Even beyond the minutes load, the clear fatigue they were feeling — especially VJ, who had to take off a possession or two in the corner in OT — may have been the difference between a win and a loss.

VJ Edgecombe has given them a remarkable safety net late, but if this start is going to hold over the course of a long season, they need to stop relying on it.

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